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The Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota Program: 
The Effects on Fishermen and Potential Outlook 
Nathan Miller 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 In January 2007, the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery took a step toward 
sustainability and began management under an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system. 
The hope is that direct ownership stakes by fishers brings more direct involvement on 
behalf of the boat owners and fishermen as well as more responsible and sustainable 
fishing practices on depressed fish populations. The research was conducted in order to 
study the welfare of local fishing communities as well as the effects on the red snapper 
fishery itself.  Traditional fisheries and economic data were analyzed.  In addition a Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of the Florida Gulf Coast communities involved in the red 
snapper fishery was performed to compare to the analysis of fishing communities 
prepared by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  Finally, online and phone 
surveys of fishermen involved in the red snapper fishery were performed to gauge their 
responses to the change in management. 
 The study reveals a strong correlation between the DEA analysis of fishing 
communities affected and the analysis performed by NMFS, and reinforces DEA as a 
method of determining involvement in a fishery.  Additionally, the thesis indicates the 
vi 
 
red snapper IFQ has performed as expected in some areas by its supporters – an average 
gulf-wide ex-vessel price per pound increase of 10% in just three years; elimination of 
the rush to fish due to guaranteed quota; and a shift in fleet composition as the number of 
share owners owning less than 2.00% have dwindled, and the number of shareholders 
possessing greater than 2.00% of the quota has increased gulf-wide by 50%.  However, in 
other areas such as effort reduction and bycatch rates, the IFQ appears to have mixed 
results.  A reported decline in effort is likely attributable to a reduction in the overall 
gulf-wide red snapper quota between 2007 and 2008 rather than the IFQ, and even NMFS 
doubts the bycatch data that are being reported by fishermen.  Most importantly, current 
IFQ shareholders were surveyed via phone and internet revealing not only an overall 
disapproval by most fishers of the IFQ design process, but also effects contrary to those 
publicized by IFQ supporters, and a general distrust in fisheries management. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 The Gulf of Mexico is home to a diverse field of economically and socially 
important fisheries.  In Florida alone in 2008, the Gulf of Mexico seafood industry as a 
whole provided 108,695 jobs and $5.7 billion in sales (NMFS, 2010).  A key component 
of that success, particularly in Florida, is red snapper (Lutjanus campechanus).  As of 
2008, red snapper was in the top ten of total commercial landings revenue in the state in 
addition to holding the second-highest average annual price for a key commercial species 
in the Gulf of Mexico (NMFS, 2010).  Red snapper has established a place of historical 
importance in the state, with a history of Florida fishermen harvesting it commercially 
since the 1850’s (Garber, Tringali, & Stuck, 2004).  Their catches have been sold in 
markets as far away as New York since the 1870’s, and fishing communities throughout 
Florida have grown and thrived because of fish such as red snapper (Garber, Tringali, & 
Stuck, 2004).     
Yet management efforts for the red snapper fishery did not begin in earnest until 
November of 1984 when the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (GMFMC) 
established the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan (FMP) (Garber, Tringali, & Stuck, 
2004).  Managed primarily by setting a fleet-wide total allowable catch (TAC) and 
adjusting the seasons accordingly, the red snapper population dwindled and year after 
year the fleet saw worsening economic conditions.  From a high of 14 million pounds 
annually in the mid 1960’s, the yearly take in 1990 was down to less than 3 million 
pounds.  Beginning in the 1980’s chain reactions began occurring as the GMFMC set 
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TAC quotas that were correspondingly caught within the first few months of the year. 
Shutting down the season so early caused economic and social turmoil, requiring 
emergency reopening of the seasons to alleviate the strain on the fishermen, which in turn 
led to the fleet exceeding the initial TAC (Keithly Jr., 2001).  This cycle of open and 
closed seasons and the resulting rush to catch fish led to seasonal market gluts which in 
turn led to continually declining ex-vessel values (the price paid to the fishermen for the 
fish) of red snapper. 
 By the 1990’s, despite establishing a moratorium on issuing new fishing permits 
as well as a tiered system of trip limits the “gold-rush”, or “derby” style of fishing 
commonly found in open access fisheries continued.  As a result, in 1996 an Individual 
Fishing Quota program (IFQ), was instituted and scheduled to begin in April of that year.  
An IFQ is a method of fishery management in which ownership of specific, guaranteed 
amounts of the allotted fleet-wide quota are spread among individual users.  However, 
that same year in reauthorizing the Fishery Conservation and Management Act, now 
referred to as the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska 
introduced a rider to the act completely restricting development of any new IFQs in the 
entire United States until more research was conducted.  
 Thus the red snapper fishery continued operating as it had been. In addition to the 
race that fishing had become and the ensuing problems it created, also at issue was the 
over-capacity of the fishing fleet.  There were more boats than necessary to harvest red 
snapper in an efficient manner (Keithly Jr, 2001).  Finally, in 2006 the moratorium on 
IFQs was dropped with the renewal of the MSA. The following year, the red snapper 
fishery took its next step toward sustainability and began management under an IFQ 
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system.  Benefits from the reduced derby conditions are anticipated to be safer fishing 
conditions, reduced discards, and protracted seasons resulting in fresher product and 
higher ex-vessel prices. However, the primary goal is “to reduce overcapacity in the 
commercial fishery and to eliminate, to the extent possible, the problems associated with 
derby fishing, in order to assist the Council in achieving optimum yield” (GMFMC, 
2006). 
 These benefits would not be exclusive to the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery. 
They have in fact been demonstrated in numerous IFQ programs throughout the world, 
including in some of the United States’ most important fisheries.  For many researchers 
and managers these have become the de facto benchmarks by which to measure the 
success of a program.  A remarkable reduction in the number of vessels in the Bering 
Sea-Aleutian Islands crab fisheries has been attributed to the introduction of an IFQ 
system (Abbott, Garber-Yonts, & Wilen, 2009), and Dinneford, et al, (1999) cites IFQs 
as having the same effect in the Alaskan halibut and sablefish fisheries.  Sigler and 
Lunsford (2001) also cited a 1.8 times more efficient fleet in the Alaskan sablefish 
fishery after the introduction of the IFQ program, while vessel captains in both the 
Alaskan halibut and sablefish industries reported improved safety as one of the top 
benefits after the first year of an IFQ program (Knapp, & Hull, 1996).  Weninger and 
Waters (2003) predicted that if a system such as an IFQ would have been in place in 1993 
it would have eliminated market gluts in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery and 
produced a 49% increase in dockside prices.  Finally, Branch (2009) lists numerous 
fisheries as continually exceeding their TAC before establishment of an IFQ system, and 
then experiencing little if any overruns afterwards.  
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 Yet while individual fishing quotas have been lauded by many as the way to fill 
the responsibility gap missing in open-access fishery situations first detailed by Gordon 
(1954) and Scott (1955), they have always faced criticism.  The thought of privatizing 
what has traditionally been a free and open resource often reaffirms small fishermen’s 
distrust of governmental management systems and elicits fears of a permanent loss of 
culture as well as livelihood (Burton, 2003).  The definition of privatization in the 
Merriam-Webster dictionary refers to a change “from public to private control or 
ownership” (Merriam-Webster, 2009), and it is easily argued that the phrasing “held for 
exclusive use by a person” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006) in the MSA definition 
of an IFQ denotes private control if not also ownership.  In addition, access to the fishery 
is no longer free, and raising the principal for the initial investment may be hard if not 
impossible for small-scale fishers (McCay, 1995).  Therefore, although IFQs may be put 
into place to address various issues in a fishery, the pivotal issue surrounding IFQs 
revolves around the initial distribution of the quota, and subsequent redistribution through 
the market that develops.   
 The Magnuson-Stevens Act contains National Standards which must be adhered 
to when designing a fishery management plan.  National Standard 8 maintains that 
conservation and management measures shall take into account the importance of fishery 
resources to fishing communities by utilizing the best economic and social data available 
to science in order to minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities and aid 
in their sustained participation in the fishery (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).  
While environmental effects will become apparent in a relatively short time, and the 
economic effects on the fishermen who were allotted quota can be quantified relatively 
5 
 
easily, the compounding social and economic effects on local fishing communities are 
vastly harder to measure.  The National Marine Fisheries Service acknowledges that 
current data and literature on Gulf Coast fishing communities is extremely lacking 
despite mandates by both the MSA and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to 
conduct a social impact analysis (SIA).  The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
concludes that, “it is not possible to fully analyze the impacts” the red snapper IFQ 
program would have on fishing communities and that there is “a great need for in-depth, 
ethnographic study of the different fishing sectors or subcultures” (GMFMC, 2006).  
NMFS also calls for socio-economic data to be collected on a continuing basis, and in 
particular may include occupational satisfaction as well as fishermen’s attitudes and 
perceptions of management, and views of their personal future in fishing (GMFMC, 
2006).   
 While the EIS calls for dedicated studies of the welfare of local fishing 
communities and traditional small-scale fishers to be part of future Gulf of Mexico 
Fishery Management Plans (GMFMC, 2006), certainty of the social effects of any plan 
can only be discerned by actually examining fishing communities after the program has 
been implemented.  Therefore, this thesis is an analysis of the effects of the new red 
snapper IFQ on the health of the Florida Gulf Coast red snapper fleet and respective 
communities as well as the effects on the red snapper fishery itself.  In performing this 
investigation the goal was to analyze the effects the IFQ has had on red snapper 
fishermen and communities by 1) examining the resource itself utilizing common 
measures found in fisheries research, 2) determining the dependence of Florida Gulf 
Coast communities on the fishery, and 3) incorporating actual attitudes and perceptions 
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of fishermen involved in the red snapper fishery.  The ultimate objective was to explore 
the impact of NMFS’ regulations and address the lack of socio-economic data that is so 
vitally necessary in managing the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This research obviously owes much to the data collection efforts of the National 
Marine Fisheries Service and the resultant literature detailing that data, such as the annual 
IFQ program reports.  However, just as important to this effort were the academic 
endeavors embarked upon by previous researchers.  Highlighting these attempts are 
articles detailing the history of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico and prior efforts to 
manage it, the growth of individual fishing quota systems and examinations of specific 
IFQ examples, and the assessments of fishing communities and attempts to improve on 
assessment techniques. 
2.1 History of Red Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico and Prior Management Efforts 
Any discussion of the red snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mexico must begin with a 
basic background story, and Garber, et al (2004) was useful in its presentation of the 
history of the red snapper fishery in Florida, as well as the goals and subsequent effects 
of management efforts to date.  Keithly, Jr. (2001) then takes the next step with an in-
depth look at the allocation process of IFQ when this type of system was initially 
proposed and planned for the red snapper fishery in the mid-1990’s.  To understand what 
an IFQ system is and why it became the favored option for the Gulf of Mexico red 
snapper fishery one must again go back to the beginning of the story, to a period when 
economics and science began to merge.   
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2.2 Growth of Individual Fishing Quota Systems and Specific Examples 
Any in-depth research into IFQ systems must begin with H. Scott Gordon’s 
(1954) seminal effort in the examination and understanding of fishing economics.  
Gordon demonstrated why open access fisheries often perform poorly in economic terms, 
and how fish price and fishing cost relate to fishing pressure, attributing this to the fact 
that fish stocks are common property.  Anthony Scott (1955) expands on Gordon’s 
theory, arguing that if given sole ownership of a stock, the stockholder would have 
incentive to maintain the stock at an economically optimal level and to keep fishing costs 
to a minimum.  This argument became the focal piece of future efforts to privatize 
fisheries and turn to rights-based quota systems.   
The economics of fishing, from employment to the market price of fish, would 
become the dominant force behind the transition of many fisheries to individual quota 
systems.  Buck (1995) details the changes that occur once an IFQ program is established. 
According to Buck, consolidation will begin to occur as fishers with small amounts of 
quota begin to exit the fishery as their profit margin becomes correspondingly too small 
to operate.  Abbott, et al (2009) examines the Bering Sea Aleutian Island (BSAI) crab 
fishery quantitatively for the effects that an IFQ system had on employment statistics in 
the fishery.  The authors find there is no single perfect method for evaluating a fisheries 
management system, and ultimately judgment is based on how managers value the 
individual factors involved.  They do, however, conclude that in the BSAI crab fishery 
the compensation for fishermen seemed to rise overall after implementing an IFQ 
program, along with numerous additional benefits.   
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Dinneford, et al (1999) cites the same effect in the Alaskan halibut and sablefish 
fisheries with establishment of IFQs.  Closer to the subject of this particular research, 
before the red snapper IFQ program began Weninger and Waters (2003) examined the 
economic benefits of management reform in the Gulf of Mexico reef fish 
fishery, and they correctly predicted improved ex-vessel prices with the advent of the 
program.  McCay (1995) however, questions the economic benefits touted by proponents 
of IFQ programs, stating the programs make it difficult if not impossible for entry into 
the fishery by new fishers with little start-up capital.   
Other effects of IFQs have been documented and are examined in the literature as 
well.  Knapp and Hull (1996) report the findings of a mail-based survey examining the 
effects of the Alaskan halibut and sablefish IFQ on the fish processors.  Among their 
findings was that captains involved in the program reported improved safety with the 
IFQ.  Sigler and Lunsford (2001) also studied the Alaskan Sablefish IFQ system, 
demonstrating that IFQ management among other things increased fishery catch, 
decreased harvest of immature fish, and increased catching efficiency 1.8 times with the 
change from an open-access to an IFQ fishery.  They also showed that the improved 
catching efficiency of the IFQ fishery reduced variable catch costs and that the decreased 
harvest of immature fish improved the chance that individual fish will reproduce at least 
once.  Branch (2009) highlights numerous fisheries which continually exceeded their 
TAC until they established an IFQ system.  Alternatively, numerous authors have 
published research contradicting various benefits touted by IFQ proponents.  Two articles 
in particular, Harley, et al (2001) and Jennings and Polunin (1996), both highlight 
research which brings into doubt one of the arguments upon which IFQs are billed as a 
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superior management tool - the linear relationship posed by others between catch per unit 
effort (CPUE) and fish abundance.  If CPUE doesn’t have a direct and strong influence 
on the abundance of fish, then the claim of IFQs helping to rebuild fish populations 
through improved effort becomes a moot point.  
2.3 Assessments of Fishing Communities and Improving Assessment Techniques 
 It must also always be kept in mind that fisheries management decisions have far 
reaching consequences beyond their effects on fish populations.  Research efforts have 
been devoted to focusing on fishing communities and how they are affected by these 
decisions.  Burton (2003) looks at various methods of regulation ranging from traditional 
taboos to modern gear restrictions.  He argues for community management in order to 
combat the alienation fishers may feel when the resource is managed from the “outside”.  
Clay and Olson (2008) call for more research into how communities are affected by 
management decisions as well as better coordination between all parties involved.  They 
also suggest that multiple local governing management systems might be better from the 
community perspective than one over-arching system.  Ingles and Sepez (2007) highlight 
the diverse array of methods utilized in studying and managing the fisheries of the United 
States, and describe a need for more anthropological contributions to the field.   
Jacob, et al (2002) attempt to address this need by developing a protocol for 
identifying fishing dependent communities and identified five commercially dependent 
fishing communities in Florida – Panama City, Apalachicola, Panacea, Steinhatchee, and 
Ochopee/Everglades City.  Jepson and Jacob (2007) not only call for more detailed 
research into fishing communities, but take their prior research further and present a 
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ranking method of vulnerability to management decisions which is subsequently utilized 
by the GMFMC in the environmental impact statement prepared for the red snapper IFQ 
program.  Sepez, et al (2008) detail a different classification method which utilized 
dependence and engagement factors applied to data envelopment analysis (DEA) to 
determine the vulnerability of North Pacific communities to fishery management 
decisions.   
This article provides the method of implementing DEA to fishing communities 
which was subsequently utilized for this research, but it was Charnes, et al (1978) who 
established DEA with the CCR model.  In other fisheries related functions, DEA has been 
used to evaluate fleet capacity by Dupont, et al, (2002) and measure vessel efficiency by 
Walden (2006).  Data envelopment analysis does have its drawbacks however.  As 
pointed out by Stolp (1990), the lack of contribution by “inefficient” decision-making 
units to the shape of the efficiency frontier might be viewed as a loss of information.  
Pedraja-Chaparro, et al (1999) also point out that the results are sensitive to the many 
factors involved with observing data and choosing the right DEA model. 
 The academic literature surrounding individual fishing quotas to this point has 
been built primarily from third-party perspectives and most analyze numbers with the 
express purpose of validating IFQs in modern fishery management techniques.  A select 
few have focused on specific cases, but only to the extent of analyzing effects of IFQs on 
fish populations and markets.  Concerning red snapper, statistical data exist concerning 
the population and market trends.  However, the IFQ program is too new to have 
undergone any extensive analysis.  This research utilizes data conducted on other IFQ 
programs as well as some of the methods implemented in other limited social research to 
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measure the effects of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program in an attempt to add 
to the collective knowledge as well as possibly challenge current preconceptions of IFQs. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 With Amendment 26 to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan 
the GMFMC established an IFQ program in the red snapper fishery and sought to reduce 
overcapacity and various other problems associated with the open access system that was 
in place.  However, like every solution to a problem it has its detractors and must be 
analyzed on many levels to determine its success and future potential.  Any program of 
this magnitude deserves a proper examination of its effects, and this thesis attempts to 
provide that analysis.  It offers an in-depth comparison between the results of the first two 
years of the red snapper IFQ and the 14 years under the limited-entry, class permit system 
which began in 1993.   
The red snapper population itself is under examination through analysis of 
compiled fishing effort data.  This work shows the effects of the IFQ on the market prices 
that fishermen are receiving for their effort as well as the potential implications in the 
popularity of red snapper due to its changed availability.  A large portion of this research 
is dedicated to the real-life effects of the IFQ on the actual livelihood of the industry.  
The social landscape of the red snapper fishery, both before and after the IFQ, is 
examined in order to highlight its effects, as well as which communities stand to be 
affected most by this change in management.  Finally, there will be actual opinions of the 
IFQ’s effectiveness from the shareholders involved. 
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The research seeks to answer three main questions, which are as follows: 
(1) What are the effects on the red snapper fishery?  
 -Does the red snapper fishery show signs of improvement or decline under the 
IFQ system as compared to previous management techniques? 
 The necessary tools for a critical analysis of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ 
begin with statistical data overview from years before and after the initiation of the IFQ 
system.  Those data include red snapper fishing effort and catch rates, size of caught 
individuals, bycatch rates, market response to the system, and opinions from scientists, 
managers, fishermen, and processors.  Catch and fishing effort data have already been 
processed from the years before the IFQ as well as the first two years under the new 
system and were obtained from the National Marine Fisheries Service. 
 -Does the red snapper market show signs of improvement/decline/stagnation 
under the IFQ system?   
 One of the most glaring issues with the pre-IFQ red snapper fishery was the 
stagnation and drop in market price of red snapper due to periods of market glut resulting 
from the old derby-style of fishing.  Proponents of IFQs point to guaranteed quota rights 
as a way to promote fishing when it is the safest and most profitable for harvesters as 
well as sustainable for the fish population.  This in turn should lead to a red snapper 
harvest that is more reliably spread out during the year, raising the average price and 
providing stability, as opposed to the decline of red snapper market prices when 
fishermen would race against each other and unleash a glut of fish onto the market.  To 
this end, landings and market price data attained from NMFS were ascertained for 
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monthly fluctuations throughout the entire year which can indicate the steadiness of red 
snapper supply and in turn the steadiness of income to the fishermen.  These same data 
were examined from the current and previous years to compare the possible changes in 
pre-IFQ and post-IFQ incomes. 
(2) What are the effects on the red snapper fleet? 
 -What are the effects of the red snapper IFQ on the composition of the red 
snapper fleet? 
 The composition of a fishing fleet can change drastically under different 
management systems, from the size of the boats to the gear types utilized and even the 
communities involved.  An analysis of the initial allocation of IFQ shares, the changes in 
share ownership over the first two years of the program, and the resultant transformation 
of the red snapper fleet is a good indicator of the effectiveness of the IFQ policies and the 
direction of the fishing industry as a whole.  Utilization of data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) will provide a unique examination of the communities involved in the fishery, 
indicating which communities stand to be most affected by management changes. 
(3) What is the perception of the red snapper IFQ among the fishing communities 
and does the IFQ system meet/exceed/fail the expectations of all parties involved 
(harvesters, processors, managers)? 
 The opinions of the scientists, fishers, and processors who deal with the red 
snapper fishery every day and depend on it to make a living are important to the success 
of any management system.  Survey responses of actual fishermen participating in the 
fishery are utilized to reveal not only their general feelings towards the IFQ but any 
16 
 
modifications they feel might be necessary or beneficial.  In addition, hard data such as 
the actual price of the red snapper quota shares is a good indicator of the fishing 
community’s confidence or skepticism in the IFQ system and therefore will help 
determine the value and health of the fishery.   
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Fishery Analysis 
 This thesis seeks to evaluate the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program in 
Florida by analyzing its performance in achieving the stated goals and anticipated 
benefits of the program.  To examine effects on the red snapper population, projected 
stock data developed from models are presented, along with mortality trends.  Fishing 
effort data is presented, in the form of vessel and trip counts, days away, and average 
landings per trip.  In the evaluation of bycatch rates, fishery-dependent and fishery-
independent discard estimates are considered alongside average lengths of kept and 
discarded fish.  The yearly average ex-vessel price per pound of red snapper from 1993 
through 2008 is scrutinized in an examination of red snapper market prices before and 
after the IFQ program.   
As the National Marine Fisheries Service is the natural reporting agency for the 
fishery in focus, and in fact is the sole possessor of much of the data necessary for this 
research, a comprehensive examination of the data compiled by NMFS provided 
sufficient information for the purposes of this paper.  The annual red snapper IFQ 
program reports published by NMFS contained a great deal of the data necessary for this 
analysis, and additional data was accessed freely from the NMFS online database and 
from NMFS through Freedom of Information Act requests. 
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4.2 Community Analysis 
 Coastal communities rely on fishery resources to varying degrees, and changes in 
management techniques have a corresponding varying effect on the communities. This 
thesis is an examination of the red snapper IFQ programs effects on the fishing industry.  
To begin this assessment, IFQ share owners are categorized by state and share 
percentage, and changes in share price are discussed.  Again, data obtained from NMFS 
will be utilized.   
It is also necessary to include an assessment of many Florida Gulf coast 
communities’ dependence and engagement in the red snapper fishery.  For the purpose of 
this research, dependence refers to a community’s activity level in a fishery, and 
engagement refers to a community’s activity level in a fishery compared to the overall 
activity in that fishery.  Research into Gulf coast fishing communities is scant.   However, 
in developing the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan and IFQ program the GMFMC 
and NMFS were obligated to investigate which communities might possibly be impacted 
by their decisions.  They relied on a protocol developed by Jacob, et al. (2002) to 
determine which communities were dependent on fishing, and a vulnerability index 
developed by Kitner et al. (2002) to determine how vulnerable the communities were to 
management decisions. 
 Jacob et al. (2002) developed their community assessment method around central 
place theory, utilizing fishing permit data and employment data from the census, 
accumulated at the zip code level.  They designated five distinct communities in Florida 
as commercially fishing-dependent: Steinhatchee, Apalachicola, Panama City, 
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Ochopee/Everglades City, and Panacea.  The version employed by the GMFMC and 
NMFS used census data at the zip code level only when the community was not a census 
designated place, in which case no community specific employment information was 
available.  The vulnerability index designed by Kitner et al. (2002) gauges employment 
opportunities, the poverty rate, and average wage/salary for a community against that of 
the corresponding county.  The resulting list amassed by the GMFMC, utilizing both 
these methods and seen in Table 1, includes 35 communities in Florida, and assembles 
them by three possible scores on the index: not vulnerable, somewhat vulnerable, and 
very vulnerable. 
Table 1: Florida Gulf coast communities affected by management decisions. (source: 
Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, 2004) 
Apalachicola -1 Ft. Walton Beach 1 Naples 5 
Big Pine 
Key 4 Gulf Breeze 5 
New Port 
Richey 1 
Bokeelia - Homosassa 5 Panama City 1 
Carrabelle -1 Horseshoe Beach 0 
Panama City 
Beach 3 
Cedar Key 3 Inglis -1 Pensacola 1 
Clearwater 1 Islamorada 4 Port St. Joseph 0 
Cortez 1 Key Largo 4 St. Marks -1 
Crystal 
River 5 Key West 4 
St. 
Petersburg - 
Destin 5 Madeira Beach 2 Tampa - 
East Point 3 Marathon 1 Tarpon Springs 4 
Everglades 
City 4 
Marco 
Island 5 Yankeetown 3 
Ft. Myers 
Beach 5 Matlacha -   
Not Vulnerable (Index Scores from 3 to 5). Somewhat vulnerable (Index scores from -1 
to 2). Very vulnerable(Index scores from -5 to -2) 
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This thesis utilizes Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to determine community 
involvement in the fishing industry and subsequent vulnerability to management 
decisions. DEA was developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) as a non-
parametric approach to estimating efficiency and productivity of decision-making units 
(DMUs).  This approach (CCR model) can handle multiple inputs and outputs, and the 
efficiency of DMUs is defined as the ratio of the weighted sums of the outputs to the 
weighted sums of the inputs.  In DEA the excess inputs and outputs are defined as slacks, 
and efficiency for a DMU is attained if any increase in inputs or decrease in outputs 
serves only to worsen the level of other inputs or outputs.  The basic CCR model as 
expressed by Emrouznejad (1995) is: 
 
Where M = The number of inputs m = 1,2,...,M ; m = Indices of input 
N = The number of outputs n = 1,2,...,N ; n = Indices of output 
J = The number of observed units j=1,2,...,J ; j = Indices of unit 
𝑥𝑥jm = Amount of input m of unit j 
𝑦𝑦jn = Amount of output n of unit j 
𝑥𝑥 = (𝑥𝑥 1,..., 𝑥𝑥 M) = General vector of input 
𝑦𝑦 = (𝑦𝑦 1,..., 𝑦𝑦 N) = General vector of output 
𝑥𝑥 j = (𝑥𝑥 j1,..., 𝑥𝑥 jM) = Vector of inputs of unit j 
𝑦𝑦j = (𝑦𝑦 j1,..., 𝑦𝑦 jN) = Vector of outputs of unit j 
 
The original CCR model automatically assumes constant returns to scale, while 
other models, such as the BCC model developed by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984), 
21 
 
have been developed to accommodate varying returns to scale.  The output-oriented BCC 
model as conveyed by Emrouznejad (1995) and implemented within can be written as: 
 
Where M = The number of inputs m = 1,2,...,M ; m = Indices of input 
N = The number of outputs n = 1,2,...,N ; n = Indices of output 
J = The number of observed units j=1,2,...,J ; j = Indices of unit 
𝑥𝑥jm = Amount of input m of unit j 
𝑦𝑦jn = Amount of output n of unit j 
𝑥𝑥 = (𝑥𝑥 1,..., 𝑥𝑥 M) = General vector of input 
𝑦𝑦 = (𝑦𝑦 1,..., 𝑦𝑦 N) = General vector of output 
𝑥𝑥 j = (𝑥𝑥 j1,..., 𝑥𝑥 jM) = Vector of inputs of unit j 
𝑦𝑦j = (𝑦𝑦 j1,..., 𝑦𝑦 jN) = Vector of outputs of unit j 
 
DEA has been applied in a wide variety of scenarios, including the analysis of 
capacity (Dupont, et al 2002) and vessel efficiency (Walden, 2006) in fisheries.  More 
importantly, DEA permits flexibility in the weights to allow for maximization of the ratio 
of the sums of the weighted outputs to the weighted inputs.  However, as has been noted 
in articles focusing on DEA as a modeling tool, any DEA model used is likely to have 
deficiencies to some degree (Pedraja-Chaparro, et al 1999).  Perhaps the most noteworthy 
drawback to DEA for our purposes is its vulnerability to significant error when outliers 
are present.  For example, the model might assign so low a weight to an output that it 
essentially removes it from the analysis.  If enough outputs are given low weights, a 
DMU might then be deemed efficient based on a few strong outputs rather than all of the 
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outputs as a whole, skewing the overall picture.  To gauge just how influential a potential 
outlier might be on the DEA results a simple tally of how often that DMU appears in the 
reference set of inefficient DMUs (Pedraja-Chaparro, et al 1999).  Additionally, the 
results revealed by DEA are obviously dictated by the accuracy of the data provided, the 
number of observations, and model specification among other factors.  However, as 
Pedraja-Chaparro, et al (1990) continues, this same scrutiny is present with any 
quantitative modeling method, not just DEA.  The benefit of DEA in non-traditional 
situations is that instead of estimating the average relationship across inputs and outputs 
it presents a frontier composed of the most efficient DMUs.  While the “inefficient” 
DMUs do not contribute to the shape of the frontier, which can be viewed as a loss of 
information on returns to scale among other things, these drawbacks are less important 
when utilizing DEA simply for relative efficiency, as is the case here (Stolp, 1990).         
Sepez, et al (2008) previously introduced DEA into the assessment of fishing 
communities involved in West Coast and North Pacific fisheries and this research 
attempts to employ that form of analysis on the Florida Gulf Coast communities involved 
in the red snapper fishery.  As a nonparametric method of examining various aspects of 
DMUs, DEA models indicate those DMUs (in this case Florida communities)  most 
heavily involved with the red snapper fishery without requiring presumptions about the 
importance of any of the indicators (outputs) used in the model.  In the output-oriented 
DEA models employed here, each community (DMU) studied uses its population (the 
input) to generate outputs (e.g. fish landed, fish delivered) in the red snapper fishery.  
Entering the input and various outputs provides the “efficiency frontier” to be generated, 
in this case the communities most dependent upon and engaged in the fishery.  This also 
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allows for comparison of communities that are “less efficient”, i.e. less involved in the 
fishery, to the frontier as a way of gauging the potential impact of management decisions 
on those communities. 
 The relatively small sample size employed allowed for a comprehensive 
yet manageable analysis via DEA leading to a comparison of these results with the 
communities previously determined to be commercially dependent.  The intent is to 
combine the goals of the previous research, providing not only an analysis of what 
communities might be affected by the IFQ but to what degree.  In addition it will verify 
the methods by which the GMFMC is determining its fishing management practices.  
This research will utilize both the CCR model, detailed above, and the BCC model 
(Banker, et al 1984). 
The output-oriented dependence analysis will consist of one input, the population 
of the community from the U.S. Census 2000.  The outputs for this model are as follows:  
• pounds of snapper landed by a community (determined by the community 
in which the fisherman was registered) 
• value in dollars of that snapper landed 
• number of IFQ shareholders in the community in 2008 (determined by the 
physical address listed on the account)  
• number of registered IFQ landing locations in the community  
• the number of registered reef fish dealers with IFQ endorsements in the 
community  
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In the output-oriented engagement analysis, each community is being analyzed to 
determine how active it is in the red snapper fishery compared to the overall activity in 
the fishery.  Therefore, each community will have their input normalized to a value of 
one and the outputs it produces will be converted to a percentage of the total outputs 
produced by the fishery.  The outputs for this model will be as follows:  
• percentage of snapper poundage landed by a community (determined by 
the community in which the fisherman was registered) 
• percentage of IFQ shareholders in the community in 2008 (determined by 
the physical address listed on the account) 
• percentage of registered IFQ landing locations in the community 
• percentage of registered reef fish dealers with IFQ endorsements in the 
community.   
As this study is only concerned with studying Florida fishing communities, the 
percentages were determined by ranking the communities against only other communities 
in Florida participating in each output category. 
 The most troubling issue involved with the DEA analysis performed herein was 
missing and misleading data utilized in some of the outputs.  Because of confidentiality 
concerns, some of the data released by NMFS for the purposes of this thesis was left 
clustered in community “groups”, while other data for certain communities was not 
released at all.  It is obviously preferable to have all outputs for each DMU present, and 
the standard practice is to eliminate from the analysis DMUs which contain missing 
outputs or input data.  However, for this study that would have meant excluding thirteen 
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of the twenty-two total DMUs, and the desire to include as many communities as possible 
led to the decision to eliminate the incomplete output categories from the analysis rather 
than the DMUs.  Two outputs were eliminated from the dependence analysis (the pounds 
of snapper offloaded in each community as determined by dealer location, and the dollar 
value of those pounds offloaded), and one output was eliminated from the engagement 
analysis (the percentage of pounds offloaded in each community).  Complete results of 
the DEA analysis can be found in Appendix A. 
4.3 Surveys 
 Throughout fisheries literature, numerous authors have concluded that community 
research performed in the past by non-social scientists who had no actual contact with the 
community in question was entirely inadequate, and in turn called for more detailed 
research into the effects of management decisions on fishing communities (Jepson & 
Jacob, 2007; Clay & Olsen, 2008; Ingles & Sepez, 2007).  Indeed, the EIS prepared in 
advance of the red snapper IFQ calls for research into the “attitudes and perceptions 
concerning management” among affected communities (GMFMC, 2006).  
To this end, the analysis presented here includes a detailed survey performed 
amongst the fishermen and fishery scientists.  Two separate surveys were designed, one 
for the managerial stakeholders (e.g. fisheries scientists) and another for the stakeholders 
in the actual red snapper fishery (e.g. fishermen). The format for both was a multiple-
response, multiple-choice and short answer questionnaire to allow for as much latitude in 
answers while avoiding as much ambiguity as possible.  Due to the large geographical 
area covered in this research, as well as the strong possibility that some fishermen were 
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unlikely to receive the notice of the online survey or were unable to access it, it was 
determined that the most effective and efficient manner of gauging the opinions of these 
participants would be a two-fold survey system.  This thesis made use of the university 
provided web-based survey system, Survey.acomp, for those people who have regular 
access to the internet, while a second survey attempt utilized the same questionnaire via 
telephone interviews.  A list of all IFQ shareholders, addresses included, is available on 
the NMFS website and it was decided that the most valid data and reliable measure of 
opinion for a purposive sampling method such as this could be obtained only through an 
attempt to survey all of them.  Question format varied from multiple-choice to short and 
long answer, and ranged over topics such as: previous exposure and opinions on IFQ 
systems; opinions on how the red snapper IFQ was developed and implemented; how the 
IFQ has affected their fishing habits; and opinions of how well the IFQ is performing in 
relation to its stated objectives.  
 Each survey was submitted to, and met the approval of, the University of South 
Florida Institutional Review Board. Participants were assured that any information they 
divulged would remain confidential at all times and in no way be used to identify them 
specifically.  In addition they were reminded they could refrain from answering any 
question they did not want to and could end the questioning at any point.  Copies of both 
surveys used, along with the accompanying responses are included in Appendix B.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1 Fishery Analysis 
5.1.1 Red snapper population estimates. 
 The 2008 Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota Annual Report 
(2009) asserts that the red snapper population has rebounded at least somewhat from its 
previously overfished state along the west Florida shelf; however, not much more is 
mentioned in the annual report.  To find information on the status of the red snapper 
population one must look to the most recent Southeast Data, Assessment, and Review 
(SEDAR) stock assessment report of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico published 
December 3, 2009. 
 The updated stock assessment presented in 2009 utilized the CATCHEM_AD 
model as the base model for the assessment, as did the original SEDAR 7.  For this 
algorithm the assessment workshop employed data on red snapper populations from 1872 
to 2008, although recent data is given more credence because of the unreliability of 
historical catch data.  The Gulf of Mexico was split into two regions (east and west, 
divided by the Mississippi River) with each containing five designated fisheries 
(handline, longline, recreational, closed season discards and shrimp bycatch) each 
associated with landings and/or discards.  Separating the gulf into two regions for 
modeling purposes was important as the eastern and western populations are assumed to 
spawn and recruit independently of each other (Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management 
Council [GMFMC], 2009). 
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 An attempt was made to stay consistent with the previous SEDAR by providing a 
continuity model incorporating data through 2008 that is comparable to the one adopted 
before.  This continuity model indicated little change in the spawning stock of red 
snapper and a potential decreasing trend in age 0 recruitment.  Also, recent decreases in 
fishing mortality were predicted as well as a snapper population dominated by young fish 
(< 4 years old).  However, relevant information pertaining to the biology and population 
of red snapper has evolved since the last update; therefore three alternative models were 
also advanced.  In summary, all of the alternative models show improvement in fishing 
mortality and number of spawners in the western subunit since the last assessment.  On 
the other hand the estimates for the east subunit show variances, even indicating slight 
declines, due to contradictory indicators in fishery-independent and fishery-dependent 
data.  A major problem is that there is very little fishery-independent data.  Regardless, 
fishery-independent indicators point towards an increasing trend in fish abundance in 
both regions.  For all models the 2009 projected yield or red snapper was revised to 6.82 
lbs. and the 2010 quota was established at 5 million lbs (GMFMC, 2009).  Because this 
projected increase in abundance appears to indicate an end to overfishing, in 2010 NMFS 
released a rule change raising the TAC, thereby adjusting both commercial and 
recreational quotas (Fisheries of the Caribbean, 2010).  
 Additionally, similar projections from all models into the year 2032 indicate 
lower productivity in the eastern sub-unit of the gulf, and that fishery will most likely 
continue to be executed mainly on smaller, younger fish.  Meanwhile, the west sub-unit 
will consistently become an overall older, more highly fecund, age class of snapper 
(GMFMC, 2009).  
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5.1.2 Red snapper catch rates and fishing effort. 
 Fisheries managers constantly seek sound, detailed data about the catch that 
fishermen bring in and the effort that was put into it.  While this obviously represents 
what is being taken out of the ocean, it can also present a good portrait of what was in it 
to begin with.  In order to effectively and sustainably manage a fishery administrators 
must assess the stock, and while there is no shortage of complicated ways of doing this, 
one simple method is to evaluate the amount of fish caught and the effort it took to catch 
it.  Landings data can fluctuate for many reasons therefore it must be gauged against how 
much effort was expended on its behalf in order to get a true picture of the target stock.   
Catch per unit effort, commonly referred to as CPUE, is the simple ratio of 
landings divided by the fishery effort.  An effective fishing effort utilizing a standardized 
measure such as the rate of fish capture is an attempt to account for variability in the 
efficiency of different vessels and captains, while nominal fishing effort is a simple 
measure of the resources spent on fishing (such as days or hooks fished).  When both 
catch and CPUE decline, the usual assumption by managers is overfishing, and the usual 
rationale is overcapitalization of the fishing fleet.  Generally in this ratio, as more effort is 
applied to a fishery the catch declines, and obviously the CPUE correspondingly declines.  
Overcapitalization can happen through the participation of too many boats as well as 
through advances in technology that allow boats to fish more efficiently.  To lessen the 
pressure on the stock certain fishing technology may be regulated or forbidden, but the 
most common measure taken is a fleet reduction through vessel buyback programs or 
license limitations.  
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The Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper fishery operated under an open access system 
until declining stocks led managers to implement a license program. Initially established 
as a temporary license, holders were allowed to keep 2,000 pounds of red snapper per 
trip, with non-license holders allowed to keep only 200 pounds per trip.  By 1998 two 
class limits (200 and 2,000 pounds per trip) were officially established and commercial 
fishers had to hold one of these licenses in order to retain red snapper.  However, these 
license-limitation measures were merely a stop-gap measure taken after Congress issued 
a moratorium on new IFQ programs in 1996, and when the moratorium was lifted in 2006 
the long anticipated IFQ program was established.  One of the stated primary objectives 
of the newly established program was reducing overcapitalization of the fleet. 
In constructing the assessment of the red snapper stock for the updated SEDAR in 
2009, scientists utilized data from the NMFS logbook program.  As mentioned in the 
previous section they divided the Gulf of Mexico into eastern and western halves at the 
Mississippi River and devised abundance indices for both. Indices of abundance are 
relative measures of the size of a population or sub-population, by way of a weighted 
average catch rate.  Since this data has been treated it can only be realistically compared 
to data treated in the same way. Data from 1990-2006 comprised the indices developed 
for the SEDAR update. 
Scientists felt that under the IFQ program data might have been affected enough 
by potentially altered fishing behavior and catchability to warrant excluding information 
from 2007 and 2008 in their analysis (GMFMC, 2009).  They argue that this issue also 
prevents direct comparison of pre-IFQ and post-IFQ CPUEs.  These concerns are valid 
and have been voiced before in studies of IFQs in New Zealand fisheries (Lindner, et al, 
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1992).  CPUE results utilizing nominal effort data for Florida from the first two years of 
the IFQ program are listed in Table 2. 
 It must be noted that days away rather than days fished has been used because this 
is how it is reported in the NMFS annual program reports.  Also, it can be argued that 
days away from port, even when not actually fishing, is still effort expended towards 
catching fish because these days are used to travel to fishing grounds, etc.  In fact, the 
2007 MSA (Sec. 3(16)(D)) cites the definition of fishing as any operations at sea in 
support of, or in preparation for, harvesting or the attempted harvesting of fish.  The 
numbers presented below in Table 2 indicate a decline in CPUE in average landings per 
trip as well as average landings per days away.  Also present in the fishery is a decline in 
landings from 2007 to 2008.  However, this decline in landings is likely attributable to a 
reduction in the overall gulf-wide red snapper quota between 2007 and 2008, from 
2,986,712 lbs to 2,297,466 lbs (gutted weight).  The percentage of the total gulf-wide 
quota caught actually increased from 96.0% in 2007 to 97.4% in 2008. 
Table 2: Nominal Commercial Fishing Effort on Red Snapper in Florida Waters - 
IFQ Years. (source: NMFS, 2009) 
Years Vessels* Trips Days Away 
Avg. 
Landings/Trip Landings (lbs) 
2007 219 1623 6405 692 1,122,379 
2008 216 1501 5901 614 921,927 
*Based upon the vessel reporting the majority of its landings in Florida waters 
 Finally, though effort data between the two periods was not compared side-by-
side, NMFS did compare simple landings data reported in the online IFQ system with 
other available data and believes that reported landings to the IFQ system may be 
underreported or even non-reported, therefore leading to an underestimation of total 
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landings.  This fact, taken together with the mounting scrutiny among scientists of the 
linear correlation between CPUE and the abundance of fish stocks (Harley, Myers, & 
Dunn, 2001; Jennings & Polunin, 1996), leads to hesitancy in drawing any steadfast 
conclusions about the state of the red snapper stock or fleet efforts.  
What can be concluded is that the primary goal of reducing overcapitalization of 
the fleet has not yet been realized.  The first two years of the program only witnessed a 
reduction of three vessels delivering to the state of Florida, and gulf-wide only a nine 
vessel fleet reduction, despite a 14.6% decrease in the number of IFQ shareholders.  
5.1.3 Bycatch rates and size of caught individuals. 
  The updated SEDAR assessment of red snapper commercial bycatch utilized data 
from any trip that reported discards between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2006.  
This was prior to the IFQ program, so each year is comprised of multiple seasons open 
and closed to fishing.  Therefore, discard rates as well as the size of the snapper 
discarded, would be expected to vary between the open and closed seasons.  With the 
advent of the IFQ program, fishers with IFQ quota had a continuous open season for the 
year as long as they held unused quota and fishers without quota had no open season.  
Because of these changes different discard calculations were used for the two time 
periods.  Data was first split between the eastern and western Gulf of Mexico, then 
subsequently divided by vertical line and longline gear types.  For years prior to 2007 
separate calculations were made for the open and closed seasons and the following 
factors were examined for any impact they made have had on discard rates: year, area 
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fished, days at sea, season (Jan-Apr, May-Aug, etc.), red snapper permit (no permit, 200 
pounds, 2,000 pounds), and number of crew (GMFMC, 2009). 
 Resulting data was then stratified by those factors having a significant impact, a 
mean discard rate was calculated for each stratum, and this was consequently applied to 
the reported fishing effort data from the years prior to 2002 to calculate discard rates for 
those years.  Finally, total stratum effort consisting of vertical line hook hours and 
longline hooks fished was determined from logbook data and applied to each stratum 
mean discard rate to find total discards for each stratum.  It is worthwhile to note that the 
SEDAR panel believed their estimates may have been affected by underreporting of 
discards by the vessels.  According to reported data, the percentage of trips reporting “no 
discards” has increased over time, with the eastern region rising from 10% to over 20% 
among vertical line fishers and from slightly over 25% to as high as 45% among 
longliners during the years of 2002 – 2008 (GMFMC, 2009).  
 Additionally, official NOAA reef fish observer data does not corroborate “no 
discard” levels this high, although the Gulf of Mexico observer program for commercial 
longline and vertical line vessels didn’t begin until July 2006.  Funding doesn’t allow for 
extensive sampling via the observer program, consequently in 2006 only 32 trips total 
onboard 26 different vessels were observed.  In 2007 that number rose to 78 trips total 
onboard 56 vessels, but after funding cuts the numbers dropped in 2008 to 23 trips total 
onboard 21 vessels (many chosen non-randomly).  Discard calculations utilizing fisher-
reported data (refer to Table 3 and Figure 1) were lower than results utilizing the observer 
data (refer to Table 4), again indicating that under-reported discard data by fishers may 
have affected discard calculations of those data (GMFMC, 2009).  
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Table 3: Self-reported Yearly Commercial Red Snapper Discards. Number of fish. 
Eastern Region of the Gulf of Mexico (source: GMFMC, 2009). 
vertical line vessel longline vessel 
Year        Open          Closed        Total Year      Open       Closed    Total 
1993  46,533 188,400 234,933 1993 1,281 19,590 20,871 
1994  45,122 295,649 340,771 1994 1,511 23,027 24,538 
1995  34,448 288,620 323,068 1995 981 19,226 20,207 
1996 67,658 407,907 475,565 1996 1,469 19,885 21,354 
1997  60,221 306,885 367,106 1997 1,413 25,105 26,518 
1998  80,215 322,611 402,826 1998 1,115 23,281 24,396 
1999  90,206 396,085 486,291 1999 1,475 22,473 23,948 
2000  126,271 214,221 340,492 2000 1,376 17,264 18,640 
2001 114,197 204,485 318,682 2001 1,194 16,697 17,891 
2002  166,918 141,832 308,750 2002 1,429 9,027 10,456 
2003 149,519 343,558 493,077 2003 1,356 5,014 6,370 
2004 70,602 164,189 234,791 2004 1,708 28,166 29,874 
2005  131,854 114,879 246,733 2005 1,439 9,383 10,822 
2006  101,010 82,891 183,901 2006 1,879 5,909 7,788 
MEAN 91,770 248,015 339,785 MEAN 1,402 17,432 18,834 
IFQ  
2007  223,141 2007 33,942 
2008 274,198 2008 31,918 
MEAN 223,141 MEAN 33,942 
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Figure 1: Self-reported Total Discards in Number of Fish, 1993-2008. (source: 
GMFMC, 2009) 
 
Table 4: Observer-reported Yearly Commercial Red Snapper Discards. Number of 
fish. Eastern Region of the Gulf of Mexico (source: GMFMC, 2009) 
 Vertical line vessel Longline vessel 
2006 Open   
173,085 
Closed    
275,375 
Total 
448,460 
Open    
705 
Closed8,714 Total 
9,419 
IFQ 
2007 612,538 34,180 
2008 349,613 4,120 
 
 On May 2, 2007 the minimum size limit for  red snapper was reduced from 15 
inches to 13 inches.  Prior to this change the ratio of landed snapper to discarded snapper 
gulf-wide was 1.13.  After the new size rule took place the ratio of landed to discarded 
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snapper increased to 3-4 fish.  The 15 inch size limit saw 52.7% of caught red snapper 
retained, while the 13 inch size limit is being credited with helping to raise that 
percentage to 74.6% for the remainder of 2007 after the change and to 79.3% for the 
2008 year.  However, the size limit change coincides closely with the implementation of 
the IFQ, which obviously changes the efforts of fishers targeting red snapper (NMFS, 
2009).  
 This change in fishing effort is alluded to in the number of observed discards in 
2008.  The vast majority of landings (88%) were less than or equal to 20 inches in total 
length, and half (51%) were between 13 and 16 inches total length. So the drop in the 
minimum size limit to 13 inches obviously attributed to a significant portion of the 
catches, allowing those fishers with quota to expend less effort by throwing back less and 
keeping more of what they catch.  Yet 59%of the observed discards were greater than 13 
inches.  Some of these might be attributable to cases of highgrading (throwing back an 
acceptable fish for a bigger one), but more likely the fishermen simply lacked IFQ 
allocation to land these fish. 
 It is also important to note that the west coast of Florida is still plagued with the 
issue of more red snapper being discarded than landed.  In 2008, while observer trips on 
Florida’s west coast accounted for only 4.8% of the total landings observed they 
accounted for 30.6% of the total discards observed.  Specifically, in the ten months prior 
to the drop in minimum size, the landing to discard ratio along the Florida panhandle to 
Mississippi area and along the Florida peninsula was 1.55 and 1.22 respectively.  After 
the 13 inch size limit took effect the ratio for the Florida panhandle jumped over five-fold 
(8.14) from May 2, 2007 to the end of that year before dropping to 4.43 in 2008.  Along 
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the peninsula portion of Florida’s west coast however, the ratio dropped to 0.08 for the 
remainder of 2007 after the change and rose slightly to 0.49 for 2008 (NMFS, 2009). 
5.1.4 Red snapper market prices. 
 One of the primary goals of the red snapper IFQ program is to raise the value of 
red snapper ex-vessel prices and the preliminary results indicate that effort has been 
successful so far.  Per the 2008 annual IFQ program report, after increasing 5.4% 
annually from 1999-2005 the Gulf-wide nominal ex-vessel price for red snapper 
increased 12% in 2007 alone.  The second year of the program saw another rise in ex-
vessel prices and after adjusting for inflation in just three years the average Gulf-wide ex-
vessel price per pound has increased 10%.   In 2008 managers also reported prices 
ranging from $1.00 to $5.25 a pound, explaining that the vast fluctuations in prices could 
be due to dealers factoring in various expenses (fuel, bait, etc.) in the price they report. 
(NMFS, 2009) 
Table 5: Nominal Price per Pound of Red Snapper Landings. Florida west coast 
(source: NOAA, 2007) 
Year Avg. Price per 
Pound 
Year Avg. Price per 
Pound 
1993 2.31 2001 2.31 
1994 2.30 2002 2.35 
1995 2.24 2003 2.50 
1996 2.14 2004 2.68 
1997 2.23 2005 2.81 
1998 2.28 5006 3.05 
1999 2.21 2007 3.34 
2000 2.32 2008 3.49 
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When broken down by state, the average price per pound varies widely and 
Florida led the Gulf States in yearly average in both 2007 and 2008.  Utilizing the 
landings and price data from the NMFS Fisheries Statistics Division online database, the 
nominal annual average price per pound of red snapper landed on the west coast of 
Florida averaged $2.24 between 1993 and 1999, $2.57 between 2000 and 2006, and $3.42 
in 2007-2008 (Table 5).  That average price in 2007-2008 is a 53% increase from the 
1993-1999 average price and a 33% increase from the 2000-2006 average price. 
Additionally, according to this data the average yearly fluctuation in price per pound 
between the years 1993 and 2006 was $0.65, while in the first two years of the IFQ 
program the average yearly fluctuation was smaller, at $0.40 (NOAA, 2007). 
 
Figure 2: Nominal Price per Pound of Red Snapper Landings. Florida west coast. 
(source: NOAA, 2007) 
This data must be accompanied by the qualification that while landings data in 
annual IFQ program reports is listed in pounds gutted weight, landings data from the 
NMFS online database uses a standard conversion factor and reports data in whole 
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weight. Also, species specific data provided by NMFS may be purposely misleading in 
certain cases to protect confidentiality.  Therefore the results of calculations provided 
here in Table 5 and illustrated in Figure 2 may differ slightly from numbers presented by 
NMFS, however all results appear to match closely with NMFS published data and draw 
the same conclusions. 
5.2 Community Analysis 
5.2.1 IFQ shares and allocation. 
 In the beginning of the IFQ program a grand total of 546 individuals qualified for 
initial shares. An additional seventy-nine individuals who did not hold a commercial Gulf 
reef fish permit were also issued shares at this time.  By the end of the first year there had 
been a 10.4% reduction in quota owners.  As of the publishing of the 2008 Annual report 
there had been a total reduction in shareholders of 14.6%.  A list of Gulf-wide and 
Florida shareholders categorized by percentages has been provided by NMFS (Table 6), 
however due to confidentiality reasons shareholders with 2.0000% - 2.9999% and 
3.0000% - 6.0203% have been grouped together.  Gulf-wide and in Florida alone, all 
share percentage categories below 2.0000% have seen reductions in size, while the 
category of shareholders possessing greater than 2.0000% of the quota has increased in 
Florida by 1 person and Gulf-wide by 50%, though that is admittedly a small jump from 
just 8 to 12 people (NMFS, 2009).   
For its part, Florida accounted for 44.0% of the total IFQ shares at the start of the 
IFQ program, the largest out of the Gulf States; by the end of 2008 that percentage had 
dropped slightly to 42.3% (NMFS, 2009).  However, while Florida only slightly edges 
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Texas in total share percentage amount (42.3% compared to 35.8%) it clearly accounts 
for the majority of individual shareholders (69%).  As seen in Table 6, during the first 
two years of the IFQ program Florida accounts for the overwhelming majority of 
shareholders holding less than 0.1000% (over 70% in each category), but accounts for 
only 34% of those holding 0.1000% - 1.9999% of the total share and 50% of those 
holding 2.0000% - 6.0203%.  The average price paid per share increased from $18.75 to 
$22.70 between 2007 and 2008, however the number of entities reporting a price paid for 
shares was only 68% in 2008.  The National Marine Fisheries Service itself brings into 
doubt the accuracy of this price data considering the lackluster reporting effort, and has 
as one of its program goals improvement in this area of data collection (NMFS, 2009) 
 
Table 6: Number of Shareholders. Gulf-wide vs. Florida. Grouped by percentages. 
(source: NMFS, 2009) 
 
Share 
Percentage 
Jan. 1, 2007  Dec. 31, 2007  Dec. 31, 2008  % in FL as 
of Dec. 31, 
2008 
Gulf FL Gulf FL Gulf FL 
0.0001% - 
0.0049%  
159 133 150 125 146 120 82% 
0.0050% - 
0.0099%  
91 72 76 64 68 60 88% 
0.0100% - 
0.0999%  
184 127 158 113 147 104 71% 
0.1000% - 
1.9999%  
104 36 94 34 93 32 34% 
2.0000% - 
6.0203%  
8 5 11 5 12 6 50% 
Total 546 373 489 341 466 322 69% 
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5.2.2 Data envelopment analysis. 
 In order to determine the involvement of Florida Gulf Coast communities in the 
red snapper fishery, and consequently the potential extent of fishery-related decisions on 
the communities, this study made use of DEA.  This effort was modeled after an attempt 
by Sepez, et al (2008) to rank communities involved in the West Coast and North Pacific 
fisheries, in which outputs based on landings and permits data were measured in order to 
determine the dependence and engagement of each community in a fishery.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, two separate output-oriented DEA models, CCR and BCC, were 
designed and run utilizing DEA-Solver software.  Table 7 at the end of section 5.6 list the 
twenty-two communities analyzed for this study and their respective inputs and outputs 
for both dependence and engagement tests. 
Dependence is hereafter defined for these purposes as the activity level of a 
fishery in a community.  As such, all of a community’s outputs (i.e. how many residents 
are involved in the red snapper fishery and how much they catch and deliver) are 
measured against each community’s population, the lone input.  Engagement for these 
purposes is defined as a community’s involvement in the fishery compared to the Gulf-
wide activity level in the fishery.  This translated to using the same outputs as the 
dependence model, altered to reflect them as a percentage of the red snapper fishery as a 
whole.  Again, only one input is used, although for the engagement model each 
community’s input is normalized to one since each community is examined in relation to 
the fishery as a whole.   
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 For this research data was obtained from NMFS via request and online resources, 
specifically:  
• pounds of snapper landed in each Florida community, as classified by where the 
shareholder is registered (output 1) 
• value in dollars of snapper landed (output 2) 
• pounds offloaded in each Florida community (output 3) 
• value in dollars of snapper offloaded (output 4)  
• number of IFQ shareholders in the community (output 5)  
• number of registered landing locations in each Florida community (output 6) 
• number of registered reef fish dealers with IFQ endorsements in each Florida 
community (output 7).  
While the outputs chosen do not cover all the indirect ways in which communities 
might benefit from fishing, such as marinas or bait shops, they should be a reliable 
measure of the direct and immediate financial impacts that the red snapper fishery would 
have.  The data released by NMFS via Freedom of Information Act Request contained 
the grouping of certain communities to retain confidentiality, and unfortunately the 
landings and offloading data were not presented in similar groupings. The offloading data 
was assembled into nine groups, while the landing data was separated into 23 groups.  In 
addition, both data groupings contained one catch-all group labeled “other communities.” 
Due to the disparate community groups in which the landing and offloading data were 
provided, outputs 3 and 4 contained data for less than half of the DMUs.  Therefore, the 
decision was made to eliminate these two outputs from the DEA models.  
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In total, twenty-nine Florida Gulf coast communities were analyzed for their 
involvement in the red snapper fishery, grouped together into twenty-two decision 
making units.  These twenty-two DMUs were analyzed using one input and five outputs 
in the dependence model, and one input and four outputs in the engagement model.  The 
data was run first utilizing the CCR model, assuming a constant returns to scale, and then 
again using the BCC DEA model for comparison, assuming a variable returns to scale.   
5.2.2.1 Dependence. 
In the CCR Dependence model (see column 2 in Table 7), three communities 
were deemed efficient, or in this case, the most dependent: Steinhatchee, Apalachicola, 
and Carrabelle. Yankeetown and Panacea round out the top five dependent communities, 
and all five contain populations of less than three thousand people.  Carrabelle and 
Apalachicola both exhibit high poundage of red snapper landed and correspondingly high 
dollar values of landed red snapper, while Steinhatchee lacks high poundage landed but 
does contain the third highest number of landing locations.  Comparing these top three to 
the index used by the GMFMC, Carrabelle and Apalachicola are listed as somewhat 
vulnerable to management decisions while Steinhatchee is not listed at all. 
Panama City and the Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach community 
group are the two most populous groups listed in the top ten most dependent 
communities, with populations exceeding thirty-thousand people.  Panama City, ranked 
sixth by the CCR model, and Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach, ranked eighth, 
had the highest and second highest amounts of pounds landed, value landed, and 
shareholders, respectively.  The Lynn Haven/Southport group, ranked tenth, had the third 
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highest amount of pounds and value landed with a population of only 12,451 people.  The 
rest of the top ten communities contain less than 4,600 people. The three most populous 
community groups on the list, St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach, Tampa, and 
Clearwater/Clearwater Beach/Dunedin are the bottom three ranked DMUs.  St. 
Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach has the third highest amount of shareholders on the list 
at twenty-seven, yet landed only 3,670 pounds and 13,946 dollars.  
Implementing the BCC model for dependency (see column 3 in Table 7) yielded 
eight communities out of twenty-two tied for most dependent, although St. Petersburg/St. 
Petersburg Beach had slacks in each category except for dealers, therefore it wasn’t 
deemed technically efficient.  Joining St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach were the three 
communities ranked as the most dependent in the CCR model, Apalachicola, 
Steinhatchee, and Carrabelle, as well as Panama City, Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa 
Rosa Beach, Yankeetown, and Madeira Beach.  All of these communities, with the 
exception of St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach, were ranked in the top ten most 
dependent communities by the CCR model. 
Regarding returns to scale (RTS), the variable RTS allowed by the BCC model 
raised the efficiency scores of all but three DMUs over that reported by the CCR model.  
Apalachicola, Steinhatchee, and Carrabelle remained at an efficiency score of 1 and were 
the only three to have constant RTS (see column 4 in Table 7).  Yankeetown was the only 
community to exhibit increasing RTS and also exhibited an efficiency score of 1.  The 
other eighteen DMUs had decreasing RTS and four of them (Madeira Beach, Panama 
City, St. Pete/St. Pete Beach, and Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach) had 
efficiency scores of 1.  Although the efficiency rankings do not appear to be correlated to 
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population, it is noteworthy that population did seem to influence returns to scale.  All 
large population DMUs resulted in decreasing returns to scale, the three constant returns 
to scale DMUs had populations under 3,000 people, and the lone DMU with increasing 
returns to scale was the smallest community analyzed (Yankeetown, population of 629).  
Four of the communities ranked by the BCC model as the most efficient, i.e. dependent 
were only ranked “somewhat vulnerable to management decisions” by the GMFMC, two 
were not even ranked (Steinhatchee and St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach), and 
Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach were individually ranked not vulnerable, 
somewhat vulnerable, and unranked, respectively. 
5.2.2.2 Engagement. 
Both models, CCR and BCC, exhibited constant RTS, and hence the exact same 
rankings for engagement.  Three community groups ranked as the most engaged - 
Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach, St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach, and 
Panama City (see columns 5 and 6 in Table 7).  All three held the largest percentages of 
shareholders and registered landing locations amongst the DMUs.  Additionally, all three 
ranked at the top of dependence under the BCC model, although not under the CCR 
model.  Apalachicola, Panacea, Madeira Beach, and Steinhatchee were the only four 
communities with populations under 21,000 ranked in the top ten for engagement.  While 
Apalachicola, Carrabelle, and Steinhatchee all rank as the most dependent communities 
by both BCC and CCR models, none of those three rank as one of the most engaged 
communities.  Apalachicola and Steinhatchee come somewhat close, ranked fifth and 
sixth respectively, however Carrabelle ranks seventeenth.  In fact, with the exception of 
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Yankeetown and Carrabelle, the two engagement models produced rankings for the 
communities similar to the BCC dependence model. 
In summary, no community ended up ranked at the top in all four model runs; 
however five communities were ranked in the top ten by all models – Apalachicola, 
Steinhatchee, Madeira Beach, Panama City, and Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa 
Beach. Additionally, although three communities ranked at the top in the BCC-dependent 
and both engagement models, no community ranked at the top in the CCR-dependent and 
both engagement models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: DEA Communities, Inputs, and Outputs 
(Referring to returns to scale, Inc = increasing, Dec = decreasing, Con = constant)
DMUs Dependence Engagement Input Outputs 
  CCR BCC 
BCC 
RTS CCR BCC 
BCC 
RTS population 
pounds 
landed 
dollars 
landed shareholders 
landing 
locations dealers 
YANKEETOWN 4 1 Inc 17 17 Con 629 2,145 8,151.00 4 3 0 
CARRABELLE 1 1 Con 17 17 Con 1,303 23,777 90,352.60 11 3 0 
STEINHATCHEE 1 1 Con 6 6 Con 1,453 1,668 6,338.40 11 10 1 
PANACEA  5 13 Dec 10 10 Con 2,165 3,217 12,224.60 5 3 3 
APALACHICOLA 1 1 Con 5 5 Con 2,334 14,013 53,249.40 16 7 5 
CRYSTAL RIVER 11 19 Dec 14 14 Con 3,485 2,677 10,172.60 7 2 2 
CORTEZ 9 9 Dec 15 15 Con 4,491 1,387 5,270.60 14 2 1 
MADEIRA BEACH 7 1 Dec 4 4 Con 4,511 9,879 37,540.20 11 12 2 
INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 17 22 Dec 22 22 Con 5,072 2,866 10,890.80 1 1 0 
GULF BREEZE 12 17 Dec 21 21 Con 5,665 15,347 58,318.60 9 1 1 
PANAMA CITY BEACH 14 20 Dec 17 17 Con 7,671 8,866 33,690.80 7 3 0 
LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 10 14 Dec 16 16 Con 12,451 83,946 318,994.80 11 1 0 
HUDSON 13 18 Dec 13 13 Con 12,765 1,678 6,376.40 11 4 2 
TARPON SPRINGS 15 11 Dec 9 9 Con 21,003 5,435 20,653.00 7 4 4 
DESTIN/FT WALTON 
BEACH/SANTA ROSA 
BEACH 8 1 Dec 1 1 Con 31,092 218,729 831,170.20 39 9 6 
PANAMA CITY 6 1 Dec 1 1 Con 36,417 353,686 1,344,006.80 57 13 3 
FT MYERS/FT MYERS 
BEACH 18 10 Dec 7 7 Con 54,769 913 3,469.40 6 7 4 
PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 16 12 Dec 8 8 Con 67,939 71,362 271,175.60 24 9 2 
LARGO 19 21 Dec 20 20 Con 69,371 1,013 3,849.40 13 0 0 
CLEARWATER/CLEARWATE
R BEACH/DUNEDIN 21 15 Dec 10 10 Con 144,478 13,861 52,671.80 12 4 3 
ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 20 1 Dec 1 1 Con 294,161 3670 13,946.00 27 5 6 
TAMPA 22 15 Dec 10 10 Con 303,447 3,117 11,844.60 8 0 3 
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5.3 Survey Responses 
 Initially two surveys were established, both with similar lines of questioning 
differing only slightly in wording, as one was geared towards fishermen with red snapper 
IFQ shares and the other was geared towards the scientists and managers involved with 
developing and implementing the IFQ system.  Both surveys were developed and hosted 
on the University of South Florida’s online website, Survey.acomp.  Development and 
execution of the IFQ program falls under the jurisdiction of numerous scientists and 
planners at the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Gulf of Mexico Fishery 
Management Council, and as such both agencies were contacted via email regarding 
participation in this survey.  After requesting more details, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery 
Management Council did not respond to any further emails.  The National Marine 
Fisheries Service responded to the request for participation by indicating that the website 
address for the online survey would be distributed intra-agency for anyone desiring to 
participate.  A second round of requests to participate in this survey was distributed due 
to lack of response from both agencies after the first round, and a total of two responses 
were received.  Owing to the unknown number and anonymous nature of the managers 
involved in the IFQ program on the management side, there was no feasible method to 
verify that these two responses were completed by persons who actually had any dealings 
with the IFQ program.  Due to this factor as well as the small sample size, it was decided 
that the manager surveys would not be included in this thesis. 
 The fishermen’s survey was also hosted online at the USF Survey.acomp website. 
Only fishermen who had at one point owned IFQ shares were included.  An attempt to 
also include those fishermen leasing IFQ shares was ruled infeasible due to the 
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confidentiality of this data, the constantly changing members of this particular user-
group, and the sheer impracticality of surveying so potentially large a population.  A list 
of all IFQ accounts, those currently holding IFQ shares and those not, is freely available 
to the public on the NMFS website and this list was utilized for the survey.  Although the 
listing distinguishes persons who currently hold IFQ shares, the goal of the survey was to 
obtain opinions of anyone who has held red snapper IFQ shares at any point, therefore all 
names on the list were contacted.  
This study is trying to address how the IFQ system is affecting Florida Gulf 
fishermen; therefore 535 letters were mailed via post to the account addresses of Florida 
residents only.  The letter provided an introduction to the survey and the online web 
address to it.  In an effort to maintain and assure anonymity, each letter also contained a 
five digit code.  The codes were predetermined but randomly assigned to each letter, and 
no record was kept matching shareholders to the codes they received.  By entering the 
codes contained in their letter when they participated in the survey, it was possible to 
validate not only that the person participating was actually one of the recipients of the 
letters, but assure they only participated once by way of tracking how many times a code 
was entered.  No duplicate or false codes were entered in the online tally of participants, 
and no survey response was entered without a code.  Forty-nine people responded out of 
535 notice letters mailed out, with two participants responding via mail that they did not 
have access to a computer or were not comfortable using one, but still wished to 
participate.  In these specific situations a paper form of the survey was mailed to them 
and then returned containing their responses. 
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 Despite the precautions taken with the predetermined entry codes, it was deemed 
possible that some of the online responses might come from non-holders of IFQ shares.  
A second survey was completed to validate the information gathered from the first 
attempt.  For this second attempt the same list of IFQ account holders was utilized and an 
effort was made to find phone numbers for all entities listed and contact them by phone. 
It must be noted that many of the accounts were set up under the name of a fishing vessel, 
and although a corresponding address was listed in almost every case it was impossible to 
locate phone numbers for these account holders.  However, in some cases the attempt was 
successful and the account holder was indeed listed elsewhere under their actual name.  It 
would not seem unreasonable to assume that in cases where a phone number could not be 
tracked down for a vessel that the actual account holder was listed elsewhere on the 
registry under their actual name, increasing the odds that they were indeed contacted.  In 
the end it was not possible to locate a correct phone number for all accounts listed.  
One hundred and thirty-three phone numbers were correctly identified and for 
each, three attempts were made to contact them via phone before marking them off the 
list as unreachable. Those marked as unreachable included three persons out fishing, 
eighteen people not at home at the time of the phone calls, and forty-five answering 
machine responses.  In addition, fourteen responded that they never held IFQ shares at 
any point and were therefore ruled out of the survey, while four people held shares but 
declined to participate.  All who were successfully contacted were informed of the 
purpose of this research and the survey and advised that their responses would remain 
confidential.  In total, forty-nine people participated in the survey.  At no time are 
identifiable characteristics about the respondents released nor are their answers tied 
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specifically to them in any way.  All questions for the phone version of the survey are 
identical to the online version with the following exceptions - on the phone survey the 
physical location listed on the IFQ account holder list has been noted, and the participants 
were asked how much quota they held and the disposition of it in 2008 (was it fished, 
sold, leased, or left unused).  These questions were added in order to test for correlations 
between certain opinions and geographical location as well as amount of IFQ held. 
 5.3.1 Online surveys. 
As the red snapper IFQ program was the first of its kind in the Southeastern 
United States, the first group of questions was geared towards gaining an understanding 
of the fisherman’s knowledge and opinions of IFQs in general, and whether that has 
changed with implementation of the red snapper IFQ.  The questions included: 
• How much previous exposure to IFQs did you have before implementation of the 
Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ? 
• From where was your previous knowledge of IFQ systems drawn? 
• What was your opinion of IFQ systems prior to this experience? 
• Why did you feel this way? 
• Has your opinion of IFQ systems changed since implementation of the Red 
Snapper IFQ? 
• If yes, in what way? 
Almost half of the respondents (49%) had no previous exposure to or knowledge 
of IFQ systems before their involvement with the red snapper program.  Twenty-nine 
percent stated they had never actually participated in one before but they had some 
knowledge of them, and 16% claimed to have studied the concept intently although never 
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personally participating in one before.  Two respondents (4%) had participated in one 
prior.  Those who did have previous knowledge of IFQ systems gathered their 
information from a wide variety of sources.  When asked to choose all sources they had 
consulted, the top two were trade publications/websites (41%) and government 
publications (33%).  Twenty-four percent obtained information from published studies, 
and 12% gained knowledge from someone they knew who had participated in an IFQ 
system. 
 When it came to their attitude entering into the IFQ program, nearly 70% claimed 
they were opposed to IFQs.  Forty-seven percent were strongly opposed while 20% were 
mildly opposed.  Ten percent held no opinion either way going into it, leaving only 6% 
strongly in favor and 14% mildly in favor of IFQs.  When asked if their opinions toward 
IFQs had changed since implementation of the red snapper IFQ, just under half (43%) 
said yes.  However, among that 43%, only 6% had become strongly in favor of them.  In 
addition, only 13% had become less opposed but not totally in favor of them, while 23% 
had become less in favor while not totally opposed to them and 48% had become totally 
opposed to them.  Ten percent had decided to reserve their opinions until they had further 
experience with IFQs. 
 The most common reasoning of those opposed to the IFQ seemed centered around 
the allocation of the shares.  Most believed too much allocation would be granted to the 
“larger” fishermen, who were also pointed to as the primary culprits in the overfishing of 
snapper.  A handful of respondents in favor of it held hope that the IFQ system would be 
a more just management style, would end the race for the fish, and result in a safer 
fishery. 
 53 
 
 The next three questions were designed to find out the fisherman’s impressions of 
the red snapper IFQ design process. 
• Do you feel satisfied with the amount of input sought from you and/or your 
representative(s) during the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? 
• Do you feel that all stakeholders have been represented equally in the final 
product? 
• If you answered no, then who do you feel is under or over represented? 
When asked for a simple yes or no response, 80% of respondents were not 
satisfied with the amount of input sought from them or those designated to represent them 
when the red snapper IFQ was being designed.  Additionally, when asked if they felt that 
all stakeholders were represented equally in the final product a resounding 90% answered 
no.  Forty respondents listed who they felt was over or under represented, and the most 
common response was either Class II license holders (often referred to by the respondents 
as the “small” fisherman) were underrepresented and/or the “large” fishermen (previously 
Class I holders) were overrepresented (55%).  The second most common response was an 
underrepresentation of fishermen in the eastern Gulf of Mexico/west coast of Florida 
(10%).  Some seemed to hold the opinion that there was collusion between NMFS and 
“large fishermen” (those previously holding a Class I license) to give these fishers unfair 
advantages in the referendum and quota distribution processes. 
The third group of questions goes into detail about the stated objectives of the red 
snapper IFQ program, i.e. the reduction of capacity in the red snapper fleet and 
alleviation of the rush to fish witnessed under the previous management scheme.  The 
benefits are expected to be realized in more stable ex-vessel prices, greater flexibility for 
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fishers in how they operate, improved vessel safety, reduced bycatch and bycatch 
mortality, and “optimization of net social, economic, and biological benefits” (GMFMC, 
2009).  Correspondingly, the following questions and responses cover this range of 
topics. 
• When it comes to limiting access to the fishery, the Red Snapper IFQ goes… 
(Choices were too far, not far enough, just far enough) 
• Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the small owner-operated 
fishing interests in the fishery? 
• Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the interests of the local 
fishing-dependent communities in the fishery? 
• Did your fishing habits/routine/schedule change due to the Red Snapper IFQ? 
• If yes, then how did they or how will they change? 
• Has the intensity level in your fishing process (i.e. days spent at sea, time actually 
fishing, etc.) increased/decreased since inception of the IFQ? 
• If yes, then what were the changes? 
• Did the IFQ help or hurt with any financial costs of fishing (e.g. costs of fuel)? 
• How did it help or hurt your fishing costs? 
• Do you feel your personal income has been affected by the Red Snapper IFQ? 
• Rank, in order of importance to you, the top three potential effects of the IFQ: (A) 
species protection/recovery; (B) reducing fishing costs; (C) preserving the fishing fleet; 
(D) safer fishing practices; (E) stabilizing the price of red snapper. 
Regarding the main goal of the program to reduce overcapacity in the fleet, 63% 
of those surveyed believe the red snapper IFQ goes too far in trying to achieve this goal. 
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Twenty percent believe the IFQ goes just far enough in limiting access to the fishery, 
while 8% believe it doesn’t go far enough.  When it comes to helping preserve the 
interests of the smaller fishermen and fishing dependent communities, in both cases an 
overwhelming percentage of respondents (82 – 88%) believe the IFQ fails. 
 The IFQ program is designed to change how fishermen operate by eliminating the 
rush to fish, and 86% of those surveyed affirmed that their fishing habits, routine, or 
schedule had changed.  At least two people saw the expected benefit of being able to fish 
whenever they wished, unfortunately the vast majority reported of changing their fishing 
operations due to a problem that NMFS itself acknowledged in the 2008 annual report: a 
resurgence in the red snapper population off of Florida’s west coast and a lack of IFQ 
shares in this region.  Out of the thirty-nine responses received for this question, only two 
listed the intended benefit of being able to fish when it is convenient for them.  Twenty-
nine of the respondents explained their change in fishing habits as revolving around the 
diminished amount of red snapper they are allowed to catch now.  Seventeen of these 
lamented having to now throw back an abundance of snapper that they cannot legally 
keep while relocating more often to new fishing grounds so as to avoid snapper, and 
twelve stated they are simply fishing less now 
 A related topic is the intensity level of fishing – how many days spent fishing and 
the amount of effort put into fishing when out on the water.  The IFQ program is 
supposed to result in a more efficient fishery since fishermen can now fish at their own 
pace and on their own terms, however the program did not seem to have this effect on the 
survey’s respondents.  Instead, the respondents who stated their intensity level had indeed 
declined (41%) overwhelmingly attributed that decrease to a simple lack of quota to fish 
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with. Just as bothersome is the 24% who claimed their intensity level had increased, since 
this obviously runs counter to the intentions of the program.  The increase was also due to 
a lack of quota, as some fishermen with low snapper IFQ amounts had to expend more 
energy avoiding red snapper and fishing for other species. 
 When asked about the effects of the red snapper IFQ on their professional and 
personal finances the opinions remained negative.  Only 4% of fishermen stated that the 
IFQ helped with the financial costs of fishing, while 71% believed it hurt.  Again, most of 
the responses focused on the double-edged problem of lower quota amounts: not being 
able to keep as much red snapper as before while at the same time spending more money 
on bait and fuel to avoid the snapper.  Six participants directed their responses at either 
the large initial investment of buying shares, or the low profit margin when leasing 
shares.  As for the effect on their personal income, an overwhelming majority (76%) felt 
that their personal income had declined due to the IFQ, and a mere 2 people (4%) felt the 
IFQ had improved their income.  
The survey participants were then asked to contemplate a list of potential effects 
an IFQ might possibly have on its shareholders and the fishery, and rank the top three in 
order of importance to them.  The top priority was species protection for thirteen of the 
twenty-eight total people who ranked the effects.  Safer fishing practices and stabilizing 
the price of red snapper were each chosen as top priority by six respondents respectively. 
When choosing between second and third in importance, it became a much more 
uncertain decision.  Preserving the fleet and stabilizing the price of snapper were each 
favored by seven people as the second most important effect of IFQs, and six people 
chose safer fishing practices.  The third most important effect was also a tie, with species 
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protection and stabilizing the price of red snapper tying at seven votes a piece.  
Preserving the fleet came in second in this category with six votes.  Overall, species 
protection was placed somewhere in the top three most important potential effects of 
IFQs by twenty-two out of thirty-eight total people choosing to rank the effects. 
Stabilizing the price of red snapper came close to it with twenty people placing it 
somewhere in their top three.  Safer fishing practices followed with seventeen votes, 
preserving the fleet received fourteen votes, and reducing the cost of fishing garnered 
only eight votes overall. 
The final group of questions was aimed at understanding the fisherman’s feelings 
toward the red snapper IFQ after having two years of experience operating under it. 
• Do you feel the analysis and final numbers posted by the National Marine Fishery 
Service in its annual Red Snapper IFQ Program reports are an accurate representation 
of the IFQ’s effects? (e.g. enforcement activities, bycatch data, price per pound) 
• If you feel it may be inaccurate, describe how. 
• Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about the design 
process of the Red Snapper IFQ? 
• Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about how the Red 
Snapper IFQ has actually been implemented? 
• What aspect(s) do you like most and/or least about the Red Snapper IFQ? 
• What improvements if any do you feel can be made to the Red Snapper IFQ? 
When asked how accurate they believed the annual program reports put out by 
NMFS have been in portraying the effects of the IFQ system, a combined 55% of those 
surveyed believed them to be either very inaccurate (41%) or somewhat inaccurate 
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(14%).  A total of 14% believed the reports to be either somewhat (10%) or very (4%) 
accurate, and 24% had not even read the reports.  Asked what they felt the inaccuracies 
were the responses were varied, but if a consensus can be found it is that most fishermen 
don’t believe NMFS collects enough field data.  While a few fishermen make it clear they 
will never believe NMFS based purely on philosophical differences, most doubt the 
numbers NMFS produces because they don’t believe NMFS’s data is grounded in reality. 
 When asked to judge the IFQ program now that they possess a two year 
perspective, the majority of fishermen felt negatively about the design process (59%) as 
well as the implementation of the program (57%).  In the minority were those who had 
either a somewhat or very positive feeling about either the design process (16%) or how 
the program has been implemented (18%). 
 Finally, when asked what they liked most about the IFQ program the general 
response was the ability to fish at their pace, when they so desired.  What was liked the 
least garnered much more responses, and the common theme was the perceived 
elimination of the small fishermen from the industry and the small net gain of leasing 
shares versus the prohibitive cost of buying shares.  When asked what improvements 
could be made to the system, the responses were varied and generally in direct relation to 
their least favorite part of the program.  Many called for an improved, more up to date 
assessment of the red snapper population corresponding with a wider distribution of the 
quota.  Some called for a division in the Gulf of Mexico into separate management 
sectors to allow for geographical differences in fishing styles and snapper populations. 
Others bemoaned the size limit of 15 inches, attributing much of the bycatch to it. 
Finally, while some called for the complete abandonment of the IFQ program, others 
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simply wished to see a revision in which the lease option was removed, effectively 
assuring that all those involved in the fishery are actually fishing and not collecting 
income for merely owning shares that they lease out.  It should be noted that both those 
with negative and positive feelings toward the program design and implementation felt 
the program could be improved with a revised assessment of the stock and quota 
disbursement.   
5.3.2 Phone surveys. 
 Questions for the phone survey were identical to those utilized in the online 
survey with the exception of three new ones added as methods of relating the opinions of 
respondents with their physical location and quota allotment.  The new questions were: 
• Location? 
• How much quota were you allotted? 
• In 2008 did you fish your quota, sell (lease) it, or do nothing with it? 
In total, 49 people chose to participate in the phone survey; 20 were from the 
eastern Gulf/peninsula of Florida region and 29 were from the northern Gulf/panhandle 
of Florida region.  For the purposes of this survey the dividing line between the northern 
Gulf/panhandle region and the eastern Gulf/peninsula region is defined as the city of 
Steinhatchee, Steinhatchee being included in the panhandle region.  According to the 
amount of quota that respondents reported, thirteen of them owned more than 1,000 lbs. 
of snapper and twenty-eight owned less than 100 lbs., with the amounts ranging from 
120,000 lbs. on the top end to 1 lb. at the bottom.  Only one person did not wish to submit 
their quota information.  While quota is allotted in percentages, the vast majority of 
participants did not know the exact IFQ percentage they owned and instead responded 
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with a poundage amount.  However, as this amount merely represents a person’s quota 
percentage translated into actual pounds, it is still reflective of the relative size of the 
respondent’s quota percentage.  For purposes of this research an IFQ share allocation 
calculator provided by NMFS is being utilized to convert poundage to percentage.  The 
average quota allotment of the eastern Gulf/peninsula region shareholders was 197 lbs, 
with the highest amount being 2000 lbs.  The average quota allotment of the northern 
Gulf/panhandle region was 10,312 lbs., with the highest amount being slightly less than 
120,000 lbs. 
Out of the forty-seven people who divulged their quota allotment twenty-two 
people fished their quota, ten leased it, and two did some combination of the two options. 
Only thirteen people (27%) did nothing with their quota, and the average annual 
allotment of these people was eighty pounds.  This includes one person who held 500 
pounds of quota, significantly higher than the rest; if that person’s allotment is excluded 
from the calculation then the average allotment of those who did nothing would be 42 
pounds.  Although there appears to be an obvious connection between those who did not 
utilize their quota allotment and the amount of quota they hold, the same cannot be said 
for those who either fished or leased out their quota.  The highest amount of quota fished 
was 50,000 lbs. (just over a 2% share amount) and the lowest amount fished was 7 lbs. 
(0.0003% share amount).  Of those who leased all of their shares, 400 lbs. (0.0174%) was 
the highest associated amount and 100 lbs. (0.0044%) was the lowest.  There were also 
four respondents who leased at least half of their shares and fished the rest.  Their 
allotments ranged from approximately 1,600 lbs. to just under 120,000 lbs.   
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Fifty-five percent of the phone interviewees stated they had no previous exposure 
to IFQ programs, 45% claimed they at least had some knowledge of them, gleaned from a 
variety of sources.  As in the online survey, the majority in the phone survey gained their 
knowledge of IFQ systems from trade sources (20%), followed closely by experience of 
someone they know in an IFQ system (16%) and information collected from government 
sources (14%).  
Opinions of IFQ systems previous to implementation of the red snapper program 
seemed to be closely divided between those who thought favorably of IFQs and those 
who didn’t (Figure 3).  The majority were strongly opposed (33%), however only 8% 
were mildly opposed, and a total of 34% (20% strongly and 14% mildly) held a 
previously favorable opinion of IFQs.  Twenty-four percent, the second highest 
percentage rate, held no opinion either way of IFQs previous to the red snapper program. 
Those who were opposed, either strongly or mildly, ended up being allotted an average of 
328 lbs., and came equally from the northern Gulf/panhandle (10 people) and the eastern  
 
Figure 3: Opinion of IFQ systems prior to this experience.  Respondents were asked 
how they felt towards IFQ systems in general before the red snapper IFQ.  
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Gulf/peninsula (10 people) regions.  Those in favor of IFQ systems prior to the red 
snapper IFQ program ended up being allotted an average of 15,629 lbs. and 
predominantly came from the northern Gulf/panhandle region (13 people) as opposed to 
the  eastern Gulf/peninsula region (4 people).  
When asked if their opinion of IFQ systems had changed since implementation of 
the red snapper IFQ (Figure 4), only 37% had changed their opinion, and of these a slight 
majority became totally opposed to IFQs (41%).  In all, the respondents who became 
totally opposed or less opposed but not in favor of the program ended up with an average 
quota allotment of 3,168 lbs. and hailed predominantly from the northern Gulf/ panhandle 
region.  However, the phone survey also found 32% strongly in favor of IFQs after 
implementation of the red snapper program, and these respondents along with those less 
in favor but not opposed to the program (23%) held an average of 22,046 lbs. and also 
hailed predominantly from the northern Gulf/panhandle region.  
 
Figure 4: Opinion of IFQ Systems since implementation of the Red Snapper IFQ. 
Respondents whose opinions had changed since implementation of the red snapper IFQ 
were asked how they felt about IFQ systems in general now. 
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 The phone participants were asked next whether they felt satisfied with the 
amount of input sought from them or their representative, and if they felt all stakeholders 
had been represented equally in the final product.  The resounding majority (71%) was 
not satisfied (Figure 5) nor did they feel that all the stakeholders had been represented 
equally (73%) (Figure 6).  When asked who they felt was misrepresented, a combined 22 
out of 31 people responded that either “smaller” fishermen were underrepresented and/or 
“bigger” fishermen were overrepresented.  The average quota amount held by the 73% 
who did not feel that all stakeholders had been represented equally was 2,596 lbs., with 
the highest amount held by any one shareholder being 35,000 lbs. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Satisfaction with amount of input sought during the design process. 
Participants were asked if they were satisfied with amount of input sought from them. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
Yes
No
No answer
11
35
3
8
39
2
Phone Online
 64 
 
Figure 6: Opinions on equal representation by all stakeholders. Participants were 
asked if they felt all stakeholders had been represented equally. 
In answer to questions of the IFQ program limiting access to the fishery, the 
majority of people deemed that the IFQ went too far in limiting access to the fishery 
(55%), although a slightly higher amount (33% phone vs. 20% online) believed the IFQ 
went just far enough. The overwhelming majority (71%) did not feel that the IFQ was 
helping to preserve the smaller fishermen (Figure 7), nor helping to preserve the interests 
of the fishing dependent communities (61%) (Figure 8).  In response to both questions, 
22% felt the IFQ was helping in those respects.  Those who felt the IFQ was not helping 
to preserve the small owner-operator fishing interests in the fishery held an average of 
1,522 lbs. of quota and were distributed fairly evenly between the northern 
Gulf/panhandle region (19 people) and eastern Gulf/peninsula region (16 people).  The 
respondents who believed the IFQ was in fact helping to preserve those interests held an 
average of 19,089 lbs. of quota and hailed overwhelmingly from the northern 
Gulf/panhandle region (9 out of 11 people).  In regards to helping to preserve the interests 
of fishing-dependent communities, eleven respondents believed that the IFQ does help, 
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ten of those coming from the northern Gulf/panhandle region, and the average quota 
amount held by all eleven was 18,421 lbs.  Thirty people did not believe the IFQ helps 
fishing-dependent communities. Those people held an average of 754 lbs of quota and 
hailed equally from the northern Gulf/panhandle region (15 people) and eastern 
Gulf/peninsula region (15 people).   
 
Figure 7: Opinions on whether the IFQ helps to preserve the small owner-operated 
fishing interests in the fishery. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Opinions on whether the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the interests 
of the local fishing-dependent communities in the fishery. 
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 Fifty-nine percent of the phone interviewees responded that their fishing habits or 
routine had indeed changed with the implementation of the red snapper IFQ, 27% lower 
than the affirmative answers in the online survey yet still the majority answer.  The listed 
reasons for change were evenly divided between being able to fish out of convenience 
now rather than in derby conditions, and fishing less for snapper and more for other 
species because of a lack of quota.  Regarding the intensity level of their fishing, 72% of 
the phone respondents stated that it had either stayed the same or decreased, and of the 
39% who responded that it had indeed changed half of those listed the benefits touted by 
IFQ proponents - eliminating the rush to fish leads to more convenience which in turn 
leads to less time on the water.  There were a total of sixteen respondents who stated that 
their fishing habits and intensity had both changed.  Their individual quota allotments 
ranged from 3 lbs. to 50,000 lbs., and as a group the average allotment was 5,525 lbs. 
These people overwhelmingly came from the northern Gulf/panhandle region (12).  For 
eight out of the sixteen people this change in habits and intensity can be classified as 
“bad”, meaning they changed their habits and fish less now due to small quota amounts. 
Five of the sixteen can classify their change as “good”, meaning they fish when and 
where they desire now instead of operating under derby conditions.  
 Forty-three percent of those surveyed maintained that the IFQ had no effect on the 
financial aspects of their operations and 18% stated that it helped them, while only 29% 
claimed it hurt.  The ways in which the phone respondents had been affected financially 
also differed from those given online.  Though five fishermen complained that they either 
made less profit because of low quota amounts or spent more fuel and bait trying to avoid 
snapper which they now do not have quota for, seven stated that they had a better profit 
 67 
 
margin because of better fish prices and no derby conditions.  New to the complaint list 
was incurred expenditures on the required vessel monitoring system (VMS), mentioned 
by three respondents.  When asked if their personal incomes had been affected by the red 
snapper IFQ, a 57 % majority responded that it had decreased their income.  
 When asked to rank the potential effects of an IFQ system in order of importance 
to them, most of the phone survey respondents listed only their top priority, so that is all 
that will be discussed here.  The most popular responses were species protection, safer 
fishing practices, and stabilizing the price of snapper, with the most popular choice for 
top priority of potential effects being the price stabilization of red snapper.  Reducing 
fishing costs and preserving the fleet were rarely picked as someone’s preferred potential 
effect. 
 
Figure 9: Opinions on the accuracy of numbers posted in the annual IFQ program 
report. 
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Thirty-three percent of phone respondents felt that the numbers posted by NMFS 
in their annual IFQ program reports were very inaccurate, and 16% felt the data was 
somewhat inaccurate (Figure 9).  When asked how the data was inaccurate, the same 
responses that were voiced in the online survey were repeated: the amount of red snapper 
is being underreported, the bycatch data is inaccurate, and a general manipulation of the 
data by NMFS to suit their purposes. 
 When asked of their overall feeling of the red snapper IFQ design process after a 
two year perspective, the majority of participants (63%) held either somewhat (20%) or 
very (43%) negative feelings, although this number is slightly lower than the combined 
81% of online respondents who held a negative opinion (Figure 10).  However, the 
implementation of the program seemed to be held in higher regard by phone respondents 
than those online, as 47% felt positive about it (35% somewhat and 12% very) compared 
to the 35% who held either very or somewhat negative feelings about the implementation 
process (Figure 11).  Seventeen people in total stated they held negative feelings about 
how the red snapper IFQ program had been implemented, although approximately half of 
those (9) were opposed to IFQ programs in general before the red snapper program even 
began.  It should be noted that of the other eight who were either in favor of IFQ 
programs in general (4) or held no opinion of them (4) before the red snapper program 
was implemented, after implementation of the red snapper IFQ one person became less in 
favor and all four of those who held no opinion prior became opposed.  In total, only four 
of the seventeen people who held unfavorable feelings about the red snapper IFQ 
implementation held favorable opinions of IFQs in general after the red snapper program 
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had been implemented.  The majority (13 people) were neither in favor of IFQs in general 
nor the red snapper IFQ’s implementation in particular. 
 
Figure 10: Overall feeling about the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ. 
 
Figure 11: Overall feeling about the implementation of the Red Snapper IFQ. 
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 Finally, when asked their favorite and least favorite aspects of the program, phone 
respondents answered similarly to online respondents.  Twenty complaints were 
registered regarding the qualifications involved in the design process and the resulting 
quota distribution amounts.  These complaints ranged from perceived inequalities in 
representation between “big” and “small” fishermen during the process, to the 
distributions given to mid-Gulf and “smaller” fishermen, to the formation of quota 
monopolies.  The second most mentioned group of complaints, listed eight times, 
revolved around the bureaucracy and paperwork involved in the program’s procedures. 
Others voiced concerns over the elimination of opportunities for newer and younger 
fishermen (4 responses), erroneous and dated data being used by NMFS to manage the 
fishery (3), and thin profits margins when leasing shares (2).  Praise for the IFQ was 
listed in the form of improved safety (7 responses), the effectiveness of the program as a 
stock management tool (5), and the stabilization/increase in the price of red snapper (4).   
 Again, with the final question of how they would improve the IFQ, the phone 
respondents echoed the online respondents’ calls for quota share adjustments, 
management of the Gulf of Mexico by zones, closer working relationships between 
NMFS and fishermen to improve data, “use it or lose it” scenarios in which leasing is not 
an option, and of course the requisite calls for total abandonment of the IFQ system. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
This thesis is an effort to analyze the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ program 
in an attempt to answer three questions: 1) what effects is it having on the red snapper 
fishery, 2) what effects is it having on the red snapper fleet, and 3) what is the perception 
of the IFQ among fishers.  The research conducted here has demonstrated these three 
questions are inextricably intertwined.  The effects of the red snapper IFQ on the fleet is 
clearly reflected in the attitudes of the fishermen interviewed for this study.  Hence, our 
discussion of the results uncovered during this research will focus individually on each 
effect, while the discussion of the survey responses will serve to combine those effects 
into a coherent, comprehensive examination of the red snapper IFQ program.  
6.1 Fishery Analysis 
6.1.1 Red snapper population estimates. 
 There is little doubt at this point that the population of red snapper off the Florida 
Gulf coast has improved over the condition which brought about the IFQ program in the 
first place.  Estimates produced by the SEDAR Update of 2009 led NMFS to declare an 
end to overfishing and raise the TAC on June 2, 2010 by almost two million pounds.  The 
fishermen interviewed in this study confirmed that the stock has recovered, especially 
along the eastern coast of Florida where the predominantly low quota allotments of 
fishermen located here are certainly contributing to this effort.  Although many of the 
fishermen were reluctant to attribute this improvement to the IFQ, the inability of them to 
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target red snapper with as much effort as before can only contribute to the recruitment of 
fish.  The amount of credit for this to attribute to the IFQ program may be in question, but 
the fact that the IFQ has been successful in this regard is not. 
6.1.2 Red snapper catch rates and fishing effort. 
A Gulf-wide fleet reduction of only nine vessels, and only three fewer vessels in 
Florida waters, is far from enough to make a noticeable difference.  To counter this fact, 
NMFS touts a 16% Gulf-wide reduction in days that vessels spent away from port in the 
first two years of the IFQ program.  Although the average landings per days away 
decreased by only 19 pounds, total days away did in fact decrease by 504 in Florida from 
2007 to 2008.  In addition, the total number of trips decreased by 122 and average 
landings per trip decreasing by 78 pounds, indeed confirming less effort was expended 
during the second year of the program (NMFS, 2009).   
But the full picture also reveals a decrease of 689,246 lbs. in the total allotted 
quota between 2007 and 2008.  So the decrease in effort was accompanied by a decrease 
in the nominal CPUE.  If the drop in effort were expended catching roughly the same 
amount of fish in both years it would be reflected in a higher nominal CPUE, signifying a 
truly sustainable decrease in capitalization.  The 16% reduction in days away from port 
touted by NMFS quite possibly resulted simply from the lowered overall quota.  Less fish 
to catch means less effort required, and it also means that it had nothing to do with the 
IFQ program.  
6.1.3 Bycatch rates and size of caught individuals. 
A highly touted reduction in red snapper bycatch has been viewed as a major 
highlight of the IFQ program by its proponents.  However, closer examination has 
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revealed that these numbers must also be viewed with some skepticism.  As mentioned 
before, there is minimal fishery-independent data due to a lack of federal observer 
coverage onboard fishing vessels.  The observer data that does exist appears to contradict 
the diminished bycatch being reported by fishermen, to the extent of causing the SEDAR 
panel members to question whether their data was affected by underreporting of bycatch 
by vessels (GMFMC, 2009).  
This leads into the next issue concerning bycatch under the IFQ program, an issue 
that NMFS itself refers to in the 2008 Annual Program report.  Due to the red snapper 
population being in decline during the years that the IFQ based its qualifying historical 
catches on, west coast Florida fishermen as a whole received small allocations of quota.  
The west coast population of snapper has undeniably rebounded and under an open-
access system fishermen would naturally refocus their efforts on red snapper.  However, 
under the IFQ program they are stuck with small allocations and cannot do this.  This has 
led to the landing ratio along the peninsula of Florida actually dropping after the IFQ 
program began, compared to the rise in landing ratio witnessed in the panhandle of 
Florida. 
Finally, proponents point to the IFQ as the main reason that a drop in the 
minimum keeper size from 15 inches to 13 inches was able to be implemented, and that 
this drop in minimum size has allowed for a higher retention rate of snapper caught.  
Being able to keep smaller fish obviously allows for more efficient fishing, yet when the 
numbers reveal that 59% of those fish that were observed being thrown back were greater 
than the minimum size limit, the obvious question is why?  The answer is most likely a 
case of highgrading or lack of quota.  Highgrading can happen under any system, but is 
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more likely to occur when a crew is limited on the amount of red snapper they can keep 
and are aiming to keep the best fish they can. 
In summary, NMFS acknowledges that the red snapper population has recovered 
enough to raise the TAC, that along the peninsula of Florida fishermen do not possess the 
necessary quota to keep in check this resurgent red snapper, and that bycatch data self-
reported by fishermen does not match data reported by observers.  Taken together, one 
must assume that at least in parts of the Gulf of Mexico, the IFQ has not helped to reduce 
red snapper bycatch.  In fact, if one adds in the possibility of highgrading becoming more 
prominent because of the IFQ, then there exists the strong chance that the IFQ has 
actually increased the amount of red snapper bycatch.  This would seem to be the case 
reported by numerous survey respondents, as highlighted in section 6.7. 
6.1.4 Red snapper market prices. 
The accuracy of ex-vessel prices of red snapper is unsure as well, hampered by 
the lack of reporting by many fishers and the wide fluctuation in some of the ex-vessel 
prices that were reported to NMFS.  However, the data that is available points to a 10% 
increase (after adjusting for inflation) in the price that fishermen are receiving for their 
catch, and there is reason to believe this number would be even higher with more 
accurate reporting.  All historical evidence of IFQ programs effects points to upward 
responses in ex-vessel prices, and in this case numerous fishermen participating in the 
survey not only verified the rise in red snapper price but didn’t hesitate to attribute it to 
the IFQ program.  This is not just good news for the fishermen, but for program 
supporters as well because this was touted as a top benefit of the elimination of previous 
derby fishing conditions.  Ironically however, as detailed in sections 6.5 and 6.7, while 
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the ex-vessel price for red snapper has risen, the allotment of small IFQ shares and the 
price of leasing additional shares actually lowered incomes for many fishermen surveyed. 
6.2 Community Analysis 
6.2.1 IFQ shares and allocation. 
So the expected drop in vessels numbers has not yet occurred and it seems the 
reported drops in effort and bycatch are dubious.  But this certainly doesn’t mean the IFQ 
is not functioning as it was intended.  The reduction in capitalization that NMFS is 
aiming for would ultimately present itself first in a shareholder reduction, and here is 
where the IFQ program is giving some indication of what is to come.  The IFQ program 
has had a 14.6% reduction in shareholders during the first two years of the program, 
which would truly be impressive if combined with a correspondingly significant 
reduction in vessels.  However, this decrease alone without a corresponding decrease in 
vessels points more to a consolidation of shares (i.e. power) into a system containing just 
as many fishers as before, but in which more and more who cannot afford to buy shares 
have to pay annually through share leasing for the privilege of fishing.  That lease price 
has reached an average of $2.45 per share, while NMFS estimates a price hovering 
around $20.00 per share to buy them outright (NMFS, 2009).  Although NMFS questions 
that high of a price because of inconsistent reporting, many fishermen surveyed for this 
study confirmed this price.  
The following statement made by one of the fishermen in the online survey sums 
up the sentiments of many respondents, “Leasing IFQ means a… net profit reduction (or) 
break(ing) even at best. Why do I want a $1 per lb fish taking up space that can be 
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occupied by a more profitable one?  My commercial Red snapper (shares) are now 
bycatch discard.”  As Buck (1995) points out, when fishers decide their profit margin on 
red snapper is too small to justify continued effort, or the lease price rises above their 
means, the number of fishermen opting out of the market entirely will likely increase.  
The National Marine Fisheries Service contends that shares will be bought by those that 
value the fishery most.  However, not only is the smallest share category shrinking, but 
all three categories of shareholders owning less than 2.0000% of the total quota have seen 
their numbers drop since the IFQ program began while those holding more than 2.0000% 
have grown.  Smaller fishers are leaving the fishery as the shares are being consolidated 
by fishermen owning greater than 2.0000% of the TAC.  If this trend continues it should 
lead to the desired reduction in fleet capitalization that the Council desired.   
This becomes a big issue because while Florida just slightly beats out Texas in the 
total share percentage amount, it contains by far the most shareholders of any state and 
almost 70% of them hold less than 0.1000% of the total red snapper quota.  Clearly this 
IFQ affects more people in Florida than anywhere else along the Gulf coast, and most of 
those affected are small fishers.  Unfortunately for these small fishers, the process by 
which the red snapper IFQ was shaped and approved was clearly led by and geared 
towards fishermen who would eventually become large shareholders under the IFQ 
system, and this is affirmed by the trend indicated above.  Regardless, the goal of reduced 
fleet capitalization appears to be well on its way towards being met based on the trend in 
share ownership.   
6.2.2 Data envelopment analysis. 
Comparing the results of the DEA analysis to the vulnerability index produced 
mixed results, however overall this proved ineffectual.  The index contains only three 
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different categories of vulnerability based on a set of preset qualifications.  The DEA 
analysis compares each community against each other and ranks them accordingly.  
Therefore, while the DEA method clearly points to some communities as very dependent 
or engaged, the vulnerability index doesn’t even rank any Florida communities as “very 
vulnerable.”  Additionally, numerous communities analyzed for this research were not 
even ranked in the vulnerability index and several communities listed separately in the 
index were lumped together in the Data Envelopment Analysis.   
Comparing the CCR model with the vulnerability index seems to match up well. 
The three communities determined to be the most dependent by DEA were listed as 
“somewhat vulnerable” by the index, others listed as “somewhat vulnerable” were 
generally ranked near the top for dependence, and the four least dependent communities 
were not even ranked by the vulnerability index.  The BCC dependence model differs 
slightly from the CCR model, producing more communities ranked as “efficient” or truly 
dependent, yet the communities seem to follow the same trend established in the CCR 
model.  The one major exception is the community grouping of St. Petersburg and St. 
Pete Beach, which is ranked 20th most dependent community by the CCR model but at 
the top by the BCC model.  The high number of shareholders and dealers present 
combined with the low number of other outputs points to St. Petersburg/St. Pete Beach 
acquiring its top dependency rating as an outlier, rather than as a truly dependent DMU.  
St. Petersburg/St. Pete Beach’s potential effects on the overall results of this analysis 
appear to be minimal; it was only a secondary reference DMU for one inefficient DMU 
in the BCC model, Clearwater/Clearwater Beach/Dunedin, which itself ranked as merely 
the 15th most dependent DMU.  On the opposite end of the spectrum is Panama City, 
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which served in the peer group of 10 inefficient DMUs in both the BCC Dependence 
model and the engagement models.  As the leader in pounds landed, shareholders, and 
landing locations Panama City definitely makes a strong case for itself as the most 
dependent and engaged community in the red snapper fishery. 
 Both CCR and BCC engagement models produced the same, somewhat expected 
results.  Larger communities tended to be more engaged in the fishery than they were 
dependent on it.  This shows that while they might lack dependence due to having more 
diversified economies, their involvement in the fishery can still be a significant one.  The 
abundance of shareholders in the larger communities seems to be the dominant factor 
contributing to their engagement.  The St. Petersburg/St. Pete Beach DMU again stands 
as a potential outlier, as it lacks the overall high outputs of the other top engaged DMUs 
with the exception of shareholders and dealers.  Additionally, it serves as only a 
secondary reference DMU for a mere three inefficient DMUs (Apalachicola, 
Clearwater/Clearwater Beach/Dunedin, and Tarpon Springs). 
The results of DEA necessarily hinge on what outputs and inputs are used.  The 
decision to eliminate potential outputs, rather than include them with “0” entered for data 
or eliminate altogether the DMUs with missing data, stands as a critical decision.  While 
in the end all twenty-two community groupings provided by NMFS were analyzed, it is 
impossible to tell how eliminating some of the original outputs affected the outcomes.  In 
short, this analysis has been based on incomplete data, and it is certainly possible that the 
rankings might have turned out differently if data was available for those outputs.  It is 
the hope that the inclusion of both CCR and BCC models, and their similar results, 
provided some sense of assuredness to help overcome doubts brought on by this. 
 79 
 
While in the end it was not really possible to make a true comparison between the 
DEA results and the vulnerability index, the DEA analysis did produce some interesting 
and noteworthy results.  The majority of cities involved in the red snapper fishery to 
whatever degree have populations under 13,000 and these smaller communities, 
especially those with populations under 5,000 people, tended to be deemed more 
dependent than large or even mid-sized communities.  Contrast this with the larger 
communities tending to be more engaged than the smaller ones.  While Apalachicola, 
Steinhatchee, and Madeira Beach clearly are heavily affected by events in the red snapper 
fishery, this DEA analysis has shown us not to overlook the effects of this fishery on 
either the smallest of communities or the largest. 
6.7 Survey Responses 
The fishermen surveyed entered into the program with little to no exposure to IFQ 
programs in general.  Those who did chose to investigate the issue beforehand studied 
both trade and governmental publications, and while these two sources tend to portray 
IFQ in a good light, the prevailing attitude of those surveyed was one of opposition.  In 
both the online and phone surveys the majority of respondents were opposed to IFQs in 
general, and to no surprise opinions seemed to fall along geographical lines as well as 
how much quota they stood to receive.  Even many of those who believed change in 
management styles was necessary for the health of the fishery expressed doubts they held 
going into the IFQ program.  The troubling point for most centered on the ability of an 
IFQ system to operate in the Gulf of Mexico without drastically altering the fishery’s 
landscape.  The common fear was that the small fisherman would get pushed out of the 
fishery: 
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“IFQ Based on History is not fair for persons that fished in areas that had 
small stocks. American Red Snapper were extremely rare on the Florida 
West Coast 15 years ago, and are now prevelant. IFQ should be equitable 
to all permit holders and guards in place to keep large entities from 
pushing the small fisherman out of business. If you look, most IFQ shares 
are being purchased by the larger commercial businesses, which will 
restrict any new small business ventures. They can't afford to compete.” 
 
“ifg create a monopoly. the big fish mafia gains control of all the shares 
eventually and the small fisherman gets gobbled up because he doesnt get 
enough shares to stay in business and can't afford to buy additional shares 
or they are not available” 
 
“Because the fishing vessels that caused the most damage to the fishery 
where the ones that where rewarded with the biggest ifq. I was punished 
by a low ifq because i chose to be a little more conservative then others 
even though i had a permit to fish just like the others did.” 
 
After gaining first-hand experience with the red snapper IFQ program, the fears 
seemed realized and again the majority in both surveys stated they either became less in 
favor or totally opposed to IFQs.  When asked if they felt that all stakeholders were 
represented equally in the final product a resounding 90% answered no, and were very 
clear who they thought “was over or under represented”: 
“The Class 1 license holders were the only ones who knew about and were 
consulted in the design of the program. Again, assuming snapper were 
overfished (which I seriously doubt given the number and size of red 
snapper in the Gulf over the past 5 years) the Class 1 permit holders were 
the ones who overfished the resource. I submitted extensive comments to 
NMFS when they finally published the rule that they developed with the 
Class 1 license holders. My comments were totally disregarded--clearly 
NMFS had made up its mind what it was going to do at that time.” 
 
“The large snapper vessels were highly over represented. I have been told 
by [name omitted], one of the representatives on the advisory committee 
that the 200lb trip limit boats had only 2 reps vs 12 reps on behalf of the 
fish buyers and the large boats with large landing histories. It has 
virtually killed the small boats. There were only 92 large landing boats 
and over 500 small landing boats. does that sound like equal 
representation?” 
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The findings of both surveys appear to confirm managers’ suspicions of 
underreported data and reveal a more detailed and accurate picture than the few numbers 
published in the annual reports.  One of the most important revelations of this survey is a 
dichotomy created by the IFQ when fishermen don’t have quota allocation and the 
snapper population has rebounded.  Although the fishermen’s efforts in catching red 
snapper may have been reduced by virtue of not owning IFQ shares, the fishermen are 
actually exerting more energy when fishing for other species since they must now avoid 
red snapper and deal with red snapper bycatch they cannot keep.  Some of the phone 
survey participants cited their intensity decreasing for beneficial reasons, for example, 
“I'm better able to fish during good weather and spread my activities over 
a longer period”. 
 
Unfortunately, many more fishers experienced the situation previously described: 
“Cant take advantage of the mega-tons of red snapper crowding 
every rockpile reef and ledge. Must spend more time, fuel and bait 
to catch grouper and work through the hundreds of large snapper 
caught each day. My fishermen report what I do. We catch and 
release (dead and alive) 600-700 lbs of red snapper per day to 
keep 4-500 grouper. Something is wrong.” 
 
“I am forced to go farther out to sea and stay longer in order to 
fish for other species. I am also forced to throw back many red 
snappers caught as by-catch because I had to sell off my shares of 
the quota in order to pay for my vessel maintenance. In other 
words, the IFQ system gave me too small an annual allocation to 
stay in business, -it was a financial squeeze.” 
 
“I have been throwing back more red snapper because of lack of 
quota. Ive had to fish longer hours, fish in more inclement 
weather,& change areas of fishing, because even though there are 
pleanty of other reef fish in the same location as the red snapper, 
we tend to catch too many to make it worth staying. Ive spent 
twenty years of my life trying to learn where snapper congregate, 
now Im having to spend that time finding out where they dont. 
Being I have to lease red snapper quota the price I receive per lb is 
far lower than before ITQ implementation.” 
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Survey respondents also detailed how some fishermen along the west coast of Florida are 
now intentionally killing their snapper bycatch since the fishermen have no quota to keep 
them and the snapper are becoming so abundant they are out-competing other species. 
The design of IFQ systems is to limit the amount of target species harvested but in 
such a way that those desiring to participate in the fishery can do so by investing in 
shares.  However, while the high share price of red snapper being reported is obviously 
good for large shareholders, and should probably be expected at the beginning of any IFQ 
program as consolidation is at its highest then, more than one survey respondent 
expressed concern that such high prices effectively prevented not only expansion by 
smaller fishermen but also entry by new participants.  The assertion in the IFQ’s 
environmental impact statement that “investment in IFQ shares would not necessarily be 
prohibitive for small operators, part-time fishermen, or fishermen who participate in 
several fisheries throughout the year” appears to contradict the real-life effect that it is 
having on a multitude of fishermen surveyed for this thesis (GMFMC, 2006).   
Overwhelming majorities of survey respondents believed that the red snapper IFQ 
goes too far in limiting access to the fishery and that it does not aid in preserving small 
owner-operated fishing operations or fishing-dependent communities.  In a somewhat 
surprising turn, quota allocations revealed in the phone survey demonstrate that not only 
were these sentiments expressed by small shareholders as expected, but also a good many 
large shareholders as well.  In fact when questioned directly about it, the majority of 
online respondents felt the IFQ had no effect on their financial costs of fishing, while in 
the phone survey the majority felt it had hurt them.  Even more to the point, the majority 
in both surveys felt their personal income had been decreased by the IFQ.  Higher  
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ex-vessel prices are of course beneficial, but looking at the whole picture draws serious 
questions about how financially beneficial the IFQ is to those fishermen not granted large 
initial allotments of quota.  For these fishermen, the increased fishing costs associated 
with leasing additional IFQ shares is not offset by slightly higher prices for the fish they 
catch, as expressed by one of the respondents: 
“It might be argued that in the short term it could help. We are currently 
paying 3.00 per pound to lease snapper. We get, if we are lucky, 4.50 
dockside. Less the govt. fee .14 nets us 1.36. This is by far the cheapest 
fish I bring to the dock. One could say that 1.36 is better than nothing. 
However, in order to be a true stockholder one needs to buy shares. They 
are somewhere north of $ 20 per pound. For me to buy 2,000 pounds I 
would need to spend 40- 50 thousand dollars. This is a large 'financial 
cost' that is added to my operation. As more species go ifq many fishermen 
will be faced with a choice of perpetual leasing or large indebtedness.” 
 
Compounding this problem is an issue brought up during the two surveys that 
demonstrates how the links between these share prices and ex-vessel prices can be 
exploited.  Several fishermen pointed out in survey responses the ability of fish houses to 
own shares, a fact when taken alone is not a concern.  However, as the fishermen 
explained further this obviously means the fish houses can not only determine what price 
they want to lease their shares for, they can also obligate the fishermen to subsequently 
sell the catch exclusively to them at an ex-vessel price also determined by the fish house 
Quite possibly the biggest source of frustration by those fishermen who oppose 
the red snapper IFQ program might be that the potential benefits of an IFQ program 
deemed most important to them seem to be secondary in importance to the fishery 
management.  The respondents in both polls consistently chose species protection, safer 
fishing practices, and stabilizing the price of snapper as what they desire most from the 
IFQ program.  These effects are indeed enumerated by proponents of the IFQ as 
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additional benefits; however the main goal of the program has always been to reduce the 
overcapitalization of the fleet.  While reducing the fleet has the potential to accomplish 
these goals, clearly the feelings of many fishermen is that these rewards are not worth the 
prices paid in lost income and possibly livelihoods. 
This would seem to just reinforce the overall feeling of disconnect that the 
majority of fishermen feel is present between them and the management.  This is 
reflected in the decidedly negative feelings about the design process of the IFQ, still felt 
two years into the program.  A common theme among the interviews with fishermen is 
that the IFQ program was already a foregone determination in the collective mind of the 
fishery management, a conclusion that may or may not be true but one that is easy to 
draw when a feeling of disconnect is present.  Combine the disconnect with the distrust 
that these fishermen felt towards any numbers that NMFS puts out –  
“THE NMFS'S DATA SEENS TO LAG BY A YEAR OR TWO.” 
“i have never seen so many red snapper as i encounter when i am trying 
to pull up a grouper” 
 
“Alot of Captain may not want to be riddled with discard reports, 
therefore they are innaccurate.” 
 
 - and it becomes obvious why the IFQ lost favor in the minds of fishermen over the first 
two years instead of winning them over. 
“I am concerned how the program will alter who profits from what. The 
fishermen will become sharecroppers.” 
 
“I like not a single aspect of the program. Wholly unfair, inneffective and 
destructive to the traditional commercial fishing way of life.” 
 
“NO CHANCE FOR HARD WORKING YOUNGER GENERATIONS.”  
 
 85 
 
 In an effort to examine the relationship between the phone and online survey 
results Fisher’s exact test was performed to test for statistical significance.  Fisher’s exact 
test was chosen over a chi-square test because the significance value provided by the chi-
square test is only an approximation which can be inadequate when sample sizes are 
small and data is very unequally distributed among the cells of the table.  Fisher’s test can 
be used regardless of sample characteristics and is designed for use with small data 
amounts.   
 Fisher’s exact test was run on selected survey questions with a null hypothesis of 
“There is no correlation between answers on the phone survey and answers from the 
online survey”.  These particular questions were chosen for analysis because of the 
similarity between the responses in the two surveys and the extremes of those responses 
(i.e. overwhelming positive or negative responses).  Utilizing a two-tailed test with a p-
value of 0.05%, the results from six out of eleven tests were deemed statistically 
significant, with the other five exceeding the p-value, resulting from insufficient data to 
make a conclusion (see Appendix C).  The following questions, with their corresponding 
p-value, from the surveys were deemed statistically significant: 
• What was your opinion of IFQ systems prior to this experience? (0.037) 
• Do you feel that all stakeholders have been represented equally in the final 
product? (0.027) 
• Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the interests of the local 
fishing-dependent communities in the fishery? (0.046) 
• Did your fishing habits/routine/schedule change due to the Red Snapper IFQ? 
(0.014) 
• Did the IFQ help or hurt with any financial costs of fishing (e.g. costs of fuel)? 
(0.002) 
• Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about how the Red 
Snapper IFQ has actually been implemented? (0.00) 
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According to the results from the Fisher’s test analysis the similarity of the results 
from both the phone and online surveys was not mere chance, therefore the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  Additionally, the following questions resulted in Fisher’s test 
exceeding the p-value, indicating that there was not enough data to draw a conclusion as 
to the relationship between the phone and online survey results. 
• If yes, in what way? (In reference to how opinions on IFQs in general had 
changed since implementation of the red snapper IFQ). (0.343) 
• Do you feel satisfied with the amount of input sought from you and/or your 
representative(s) during the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? (0.450) 
• Do you feel the analysis and final numbers posted by the National Marine Fishery 
Service in its annual Red Snapper IFQ Program reports are an accurate 
representation of the IFQ’s effects? (e.g. enforcement activities, bycatch data, 
price per pound) (0.287) 
• Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about the design 
process of the Red Snapper IFQ? (0.143) 
• Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the small owner-operated 
fishing interests in the fishery? (0.052) 
 
After performing Fisher’s exact test on those questions which seemed to indicate 
closely related results between the two different surveys, the fact that six of the eleven 
questions tested showed statistical significance leads to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis and validates the results revealed in these surveys.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary stated goal of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program has 
always been to reduce overcapitalization of the fleet.  The fleet reduction that NMFS 
hoped for may take several more years to come to fruition, but it does seem to be 
inevitable.  Once that occurs then a true reduction in effort on the red snapper population 
would appear definite as well.  The more immediate success of the program is the 
elimination of the previous derby fishing conditions, as fishermen are no longer racing to 
catch the fish and the dockside price has risen considerably and stabilized.  Additionally, 
the red snapper stock has improved to a state where the TAC can be raised.  Whether or 
not this is a consequence of the IFQ program or just a natural resurgence of snapper in 
the dynamic natural cycle of fishing, is uncertain.  If this is indeed an effect of the IFQ 
program, then one can call the program a success in this regard and only predict even 
better results for the snapper population and the fishermen able to survive in the new 
system. If the population resurgence is merely a natural occurrence then the IFQ program 
may in fact just be the beneficiary of good timing.  Regardless, its structure appears to be 
one that can take advantage of this and build a more solid base from which the fishery as 
a whole can proceed into the future. 
But the evaluation of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program does not end 
there.  Upon closer examination evidence presented here suggests that other purported 
benefits are questionable at best.  While a reduction in effort expended by fishermen 
catching red snapper was heralded, in reality the IFQ may simply be disguising fishing 
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effort.  Fishermen with low quota amounts, especially those fishing the eastern waters of 
the Gulf of Mexico, are now expending more time, fuel, and energy avoiding red snapper 
and searching for other fish which they are still allowed to harvest.  This then brings 
about other questions which may be hard to answer using traditional effort calculations – 
how has the red snapper IFQ affected the fishing effort of other fisheries?  Are fishermen 
who could once harvest red snapper now focusing more effort on other fish, and are those 
fishermen exerting more effort than before to catch those other species because they have 
to avoid snapper now instead of keeping them? 
The IFQ was also praised with reducing bycatch in the fishery, and as mentioned 
above aiding in the recovery of the species.  Truthfully though, to lay the successful 
recovery solely at the feet of the IFQ would be presumptuous considering the program is 
still in its infancy and the data used actually took into account only the first year of the 
program. In fact, the recommendations to raise the TAC come from assessments and 
mere projections that overfishing of red snapper would end in 2009.  Multiple fishermen 
surveyed for this thesis made a point of stating that the red snapper population was 
rebounding before the IFQ program took place and point to the reduction of red snapper 
bycatch in the shrimping industry as the real reason for the upward trend in the stock.   
Concerning the bycatch issue, if we combine the doubts NMFS itself has 
expressed about the accuracy of its scant data and the testimony of fishermen surveyed 
for this study, bycatch may not only have failed to decline it might actually be on the rise.  
Simply put, many fishermen do not possess the quota to harvest the amount of red 
snapper they once could, while at the same time the population of snapper is rebounding.  
The IFQ is therefore forcing these fishermen to throw back more fish than they did 
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before.  Even a drop in the minimum size limit cannot hide this fact or the possibility of 
highgrading, which is a concern anytime an IFQ is put into place.   
Most importantly though is the effect the IQF is having on the fishermen.  By law 
NMFS has an obligation to protect the small fishermen in its policymaking, and hopefully 
this research will demonstrate NMFS should also feel a moral obligation to better serve 
the small fishers.  The DEA analysis reveals that numerous communities, big and small, 
are affected by management decisions.  However, when the majority of fishermen in the 
state are classified as small quota holders then at the very least they must be included in 
the decision making processes which affect their livelihoods. 
By allowing only those fishermen who held a Class I license under the previous 
structure to have a voice in designing and approving the IFQ system, NMFS and the 
GMFMC adhered to established guidelines and in that way cannot be faulted for having 
done their respective jobs. Yet, when the issue at hand is a multimillion dollar industry in 
which the majority of participants may be priced out of it because they are in the minority 
when it comes to actual power, the issue becomes a political and social one.  It is not hard 
to understand why many would feel that small fishermen were the targets of this 
reduction effort when the very processes by which the IFQ system was approved were 
weighted in favor of the so-called big fishermen.  In this regard, one has to question 
whether or not the IFQ as it is currently set up is adequately and appropriately meeting 
the needs of the entire fishing fleet that is affected by it.   
Overall, the short-term results indicate the beginning of the type of fluid market 
desired by NMFS and the Council.  The number of share owners is shrinking, but those 
fishers without shares are leasing the ability to continue fishing.  Yet, the eventual trend 
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in most IFQ cases is that the number of those willing and able to lease or buy shares 
declines over time, and the results of this survey confirm this.  The question of whether or 
not there is room in the fishery for both big fishers who focus solely on red snapper and 
small fishers who focus their effort on multiple species has effectively been answered by 
the IFQ system and the outcome is decidedly in favor of the big fishers. 
An IFQ system completely free of regulatory burdens might be best from a purely 
economic sense; however no IFQ system of this sort exists in the world.  All have been 
tailored specifically for their regions, and the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program is 
no different.  However, as NMFS is finding out the current program still needs 
adjustments, and to their credit they have taken steps to address problem issues.  While 
the suggestion by many of the survey respondents to restrict ownership of IFQ shares to 
actual fishermen who work on boats may seem extreme, a regulation of this sort to some 
degree may be appropriate.  Especially considering what may happen in 2012 when 
ownership of IFQ shares becomes open to even non-holders of reef fish permits. 
Additionally, while there will always be those who feel slighted in the initial 
allotment of a new IFQ system, the extreme lack of quota distributed to shareholders 
along the west coast of Florida is a problem that even NMFS acknowledges.  Basing the 
initial allotments of quota on catch history unfortunately means that those fishermen who 
either were unable to find fish or purposely chose to focus their effort on other species 
when red snapper was scarce, were in effect punished.  Now that the red snapper stock 
has recovered to the point of outcompeting other fish species, the fishermen along the 
peninsula of Florida deserve to have their situation reevaluated and quota allocations 
adjusted.  This is an issue that can and should be addressed, along with the lack of 
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reliable fishery-independent data.  It is impossible to efficiently and adequately manage a 
resource with the miniscule amount of fishery-independent data available in the red 
snapper fishery. 
Finally, an important part of this thesis research has been the DEA analysis that 
examined the “efficiency” of the communities participating in the red snapper fishery. 
The vulnerability index utilized by NMFS for its environmental impact statement 
regarding the IFQ has value in determining which communities might be vulnerable to 
management decisions.  However it does not include every city that participates in the red 
snapper fishery, and in employing it NMFS highly recommends other factors be 
considered when assessing communities (GMFMC, 2004).  This research views that as a 
shortcoming, as every city that participates in the fishery has at least some residents that 
will be affected by the decisions of NMFS and the GMFMC.  A more detailed 
measurement tool such as DEA can not only effectively analyze every city, but measure 
them against each other to shed a more quantitative look at how much each community 
might be affected. 
As Ingles and Sepez (2007) assert there is no one best method to assess 
communities, and the results of this research prove that it does take a multidimensional 
approach to fully realize the effects of fisheries management decisions.  This thesis 
attempted to analyze the red snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mexico utilizing multiple 
methods, however it could be improved.  First and foremost with any analysis is the 
importance of detailed and accurate data.  The ambiguity of data provided by NMFS 
hampered the accuracy of this research and a truly detailed analysis would require 
complete, individualized, detailed data for all communities, especially for DEA analysis.  
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Additionally, the phone survey revealed the valuable insight that could be provided if the 
online survey had been accompanied by participant’s quota amounts and location of 
residence. 
Regardless, the DEA analysis and fishermen surveys within reveal a picture of a 
red snapper fishery in Florida which is spread out through a network of mid-sized to 
smaller communities, most of which would be very affected by any management 
decision.  Combine this with the fact that the majority of fishers in Florida are small 
shareholders and the picture becomes complete – small fishers in small communities, 
who feel their livelihood is being threatened by the IFQ and don’t see a place for them in 
its future. 
The National Marine Fisheries Service and supporters of the red snapper IFQ 
program have pointed to areas in which the program could use improvements while 
declaring it an overall success.  But this thesis posits that any ruling after two years on a 
program of this magnitude which deals with such dynamic factors is a premature 
decision.  At this time, the lack of verifiable data, unreliability of fishery-dependent data, 
still undetermined effect on small fishers, and short life-history of the IFQ program 
simply cannot justify ruling the program a success or failure yet. 
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APPENDIX A: DEA RESULTS 
Table A1: CCR-Output Oriented for Dependence - Score and Slack 
  
No. 
  
  
DMU 
  
  
Score 
  
Excess 
population 
S-(1) 
Shortage 
pounds 
landed 
S+(1) 
Shortage 
dollars 
landed 
S+(2) 
Shortage 
shareholders 
S+(3) 
Shortage 
landing locations 
S+(4) 
Shortage 
dealers 
S+(5) 
1 PANAMA CITY 0.558034 0 0 0 201.3079 62.29823 0 
2 DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA BEACH 0.445961 0 0 0 165.0627 55.78038 0 
3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.369473 0 0 0 75.33994 25.96037 0 
4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 6.68E-02 0 0 0 191.9847 31.39585 0 
5 CARRABELLE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 GULF BREEZE 0.20375 0 0 0 1.69E-02 9.731319 0 
7 APALACHICOLA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 1.18E-02 0 0 0 10.44317 75.50592 0 
9 
MADEIRA BEACH 0.489095 0 0 0 11.49808 0 0 
10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.11114 0 25366.64 96393.22 0 0 1.402227 
11 TARPON SPRINGS 8.89E-02 0 64963.97 246863.1 65.24068 17.99743 0 
13 PANACEA  0.646836 0 8024.909 30494.65 7.11154 1.855184 0 
14 TAMPA 4.61E-03 0 1146442 4356480 346.6975 910.081 0 
15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 4.85E-02 0 0 0 20.48408 0 1.345339 
16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.288285 0 14656.08 55693.12 0 3.342653 0 
17 YANKEETOWN 0.818326 0 576.1205 2189.258 0 0 0.333274 
18 HUDSON 0.115824 0 119753.5 455063.4 0 0.470935 0 
19 STEINHATCHEE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 CORTEZ 0.388802 0 63683.57 241997.6 0 6.032519 0 
21 LARGO 2.22E-02 0 1220240 4636912 0 159.7183 0 
22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 3.70E-02 0 273142.1 1037940 217.9629 0 0 
98 
  
 
Table A2: BCC-Output Oriented for Dependence – Score and Slack 
  
No. 
  
  
DMU 
  
  
Score 
  
Excess 
population 
S-(1) 
Shortage 
pounds 
landed 
S+(1) 
Shortage 
dollars 
landed 
S+(2) 
Shortage 
shareholders 
S+(3) 
Shortage 
landing 
locations 
S+(4) 
Shortage 
dealers 
S+(5) 
1 PANAMA CITY 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 
DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA 
ROSA BEACH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.653192 0 0 0 8.763712 4.643859 0.952441 
4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.692308 31522 250607.6 952308.7 22.33333 0 0.111111 
5 CARRABELLE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 GULF BREEZE 0.449842 0 13093.52 49755.38 0 5.363391 2.581535 
7 APALACHICOLA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 
CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER 
BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 47618.75 137242.3 521520.6 12 0 0 
9 MADEIRA BEACH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.332346 0 39296.4 149326.3 0 0 3.290661 
11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.708068 0 139233.9 529088.7 21.04499 2.649176 0 
12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 263069 215059 817224.2 12 4 0 
13 PANACEA  0.666013 0 8006.427 30424.42 7.303199 2.099087 0 
14 TAMPA 0.5 272355 212495 807481 23 9 0 
15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 9.22E-02 0 0 0 3.662509 0 1.463132 
16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.404208 0 18389.35 69879.55 0 2.237038 0 
17 YANKEETOWN 1 0 0 0 0 0 6.00E-06 
18 HUDSON 0.446243 0 91563.52 347941.4 0 0 0 
19 STEINHATCHEE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 CORTEZ 0.752901 0 33667.57 127936.8 0 4.723327 3.54523 
21 LARGO 0.22807 32954 349244.4 1327129 0 13 3 
22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.72549 22813.49 239355.5 909550.7 33.64865 0 0 
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Table A3: BCC-Output Oriented for Dependence – RTS 
No. DMU Score RTS 
RTS of Projected 
DMU RTS Eff Proj Total 
1 PANAMA CITY 1 Decreasing 
 
No. of 
IRS 1 1 2 
2 
DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA 
ROSA BEACH 1 Decreasing 
 
No. of 
CRS 3 0 3 
3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.653192 
 
Decreasing 
No. of 
DRS 3 14 17 
4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.6923077 
 
Decreasing Total 7 15 22 
5 CARRABELLE 1 Constant 
      6 GULF BREEZE 0.4498423 
 
Decreasing 
    7 APALACHICOLA 1 Constant 
      
8 
CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER 
BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 
 
Decreasing 
    9 MADEIRA BEACH 1 Decreasing 
     10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.3323461 
 
Decreasing 
    11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.7080679 
 
Decreasing 
    12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 
 
Decreasing 
    13 PANACEA  0.6660129 
 
Increasing 
     14 TAMPA 0.5 
 
Decreasing 
    15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 9.22E-02 
 
Decreasing 
    16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.4042085 
 
Decreasing 
    17 YANKEETOWN 1 Increasing 
      18 HUDSON 0.4462431 
 
Decreasing 
    19 STEINHATCHEE 1 Constant 
      20 CORTEZ 0.7529005 
 
Decreasing 
    21 LARGO 0.2280702 
 
Decreasing 
    22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.7254902 
 
Decreasing 
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Table A4: CCR-Output Oriented for Engagement – Score and Slack 
  
No. 
  
  
DMU 
  
  
Score 
  
Excess 
  
S-(1) 
Shortage 
pounds 
landed  
S+(1) 
Shortage 
shareholders 
S+(2) 
Shortage 
landing 
locations 
S+(3) 
Shortage 
dealers 
S+(4) 
1 PANAMA CITY 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 
DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA 
BEACH 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.237346121 0 0 1.991436 5.261532 4 
4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.692307593 0 27.18301 4.174454 0 0.148148 
5 CARRABELLE 0.230769626 0 27.18789 1.744564 0 4 
6 GULF BREEZE 0.2 0 20.2814 0 3.193623 0 
7 APALACHICOLA 0.833333333 0 18.40222 3.364491 0 0 
8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 0 14.88648 2.242993 0 0 
9 MADEIRA BEACH 0.92307722 0 37.20292 8.426792 0 1.111112 
10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.230769626 0 34.1965 4.984433 0 4 
11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.666666667 0 5.345594 3.644862 0 0 
12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 0 23.32712 2.242991 2.39521 0 
13 PANACEA  0.5 0 23.02731 5.420561 1.7964 0 
14 TAMPA 0.5 0 23.049 4.299065 5.38922 0 
15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 0.07692278 0 34.32244 8.22429 0 4 
16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.333333333 0 22.85409 3.364486 1.79642 0 
17 YANKEETOWN 0.230769626 0 37.35556 7.414336 0 4 
18 HUDSON 0.392156959 0 27.65265 3.056077 0 0 
19 STEINHATCHEE 0.769230374 0 38.12857 7.981307 0 2.266666 
20 CORTEZ 0.266666667 0 34.13996 0 2.694627 0 
21 LARGO 0.228070175 0 37.882 0 7.78443 4 
22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.72549062 0 25.96253 6.289472 0 0 
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Table A5: BCC-Output Oriented for Engagement – Score and Slack 
  
No. 
  
  
DMU 
  
  
Score 
  
Excess 
  
S-(1) 
Shortage 
pounds 
landed  
S+(1) 
Shortage 
shareholders 
S+(2) 
Shortage 
landing 
locations 
S+(3) 
Shortage 
dealers 
S+(4) 
1 PANAMA CITY 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 
DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA 
BEACH 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.237346121 0 0 1.991436 5.261532 4 
4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.692307593 0 27.18301 4.174454 0 0.148148 
5 CARRABELLE 0.230769626 0 27.18789 1.744564 0 4 
6 GULF BREEZE 0.2 0 20.2814 0 3.193623 0 
7 APALACHICOLA 0.833333333 0 18.40222 3.364491 0 0 
8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 0 14.88648 2.242993 0 0 
9 MADEIRA BEACH 0.92307722 0 37.20292 8.426792 0 1.111112 
10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.230769626 0 34.1965 4.984433 0 4 
11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.666666667 0 5.345594 3.644862 0 0 
12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 0 23.32712 2.242991 2.39521 0 
13 PANACEA  0.5 0 23.02731 5.420561 1.7964 0 
14 TAMPA 0.5 0 23.049 4.299065 5.38922 0 
15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 0.07692278 0 34.32244 8.22429 0 4 
16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.333333333 0 22.85409 3.364486 1.79642 0 
17 YANKEETOWN 0.230769626 0 37.35556 7.414336 0 4 
18 HUDSON 0.392156959 0 27.65265 3.056077 0 0 
19 STEINHATCHEE 0.769230374 0 38.12857 7.981307 0 2.266666 
20 CORTEZ 0.266666667 0 34.13996 0 2.694627 0 
21 LARGO 0.228070175 0 37.882 0 7.78443 4 
22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.72549062 0 25.96253 6.289472 0 0 
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Table A6: BCC-Output Oriented for Engagement – RTS 
No. DMU Score RTS RTS of Projected DMU RTS Eff Proj Total 
1 PANAMA CITY 1 Constant 
   
No. of 
IRS 0 0 0 
2 DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA BEACH 1 Constant 
   
No. of 
CRS 2 20 22 
3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.237346 
 
Constant 
  
No. of 
DRS 0 0 0 
4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.692308 
 
Constant 
  
Total 2 20 22 
5 CARRABELLE 0.23077 
 
Constant 
      6 GULF BREEZE 0.2 
 
Constant 
      7 APALACHICOLA 0.833333 
 
Constant 
      8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 
 
Constant 
      9 MADEIRA BEACH 0.923077 
 
Constant 
      10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.23077 
 
Constant 
      11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.666667 
 
Constant 
      12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 
 
Constant 
      13 PANACEA  0.5 
 
Constant 
      14 TAMPA 0.5 
 
Constant 
      15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 7.69E-02 
 
Constant 
      16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.333333 
 
Constant 
      17 YANKEETOWN 0.23077 
 
Constant 
      18 HUDSON 0.392157 
 
Constant 
      19 STEINHATCHEE 0.76923 
 
Constant 
      20 CORTEZ 0.266667 
 
Constant 
      21 LARGO 0.22807 
 
Constant 
      22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.725491 
 
Constant 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESULTS 
 
ONLINE SURVEY 
How much previous exposure to IFQs did you have before 
implementation of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ? 
No exposure at all. 24 49% 
No actual participation but knew of them. 14 29% 
No actual participation but studied the concept intently. 8 16% 
Participated in one before. 2 4% 
no answer 1 2% 
   From where was your previous knowledge of IFQ systems drawn? (check 
all that apply) 
Personal involvement in another IFQ system. 2 4% 
Experience of someone I know in another IFQ system. 6 12% 
Information from trade publications and/or websites. 20 41% 
Information from governmental publications and/or websites. 16 33% 
Information from published studies. 12 24% 
No previous knowledge. 14 29% 
other: 8 16% 
   What was your opinion of IFQ systems prior to this experience? 
 Strongly opposed. 23 47% 
Mildly opposed. 10 20% 
Strongly in favor. 3 6% 
Mildly in favor. 7 14% 
I had no opinion. 5 10% 
no answer 1 2% 
   Has your opinion of IFQ systems changed since implementation of the 
Red Snapper IFQ? 
Yes 21 43% 
No 28 57% 
no answer 0 0% 
   If yes, in what way? 
  I've become strongly in favor of them. 2 4% 
I've become less opposed but not totally in favor of them. 4 8% 
I am now reserving any opinion until I have more experience with this IFQ. 3 6% 
I've become less in favor but not totally opposed to them. 7 14% 
I've become totally opposed to them. 15 31% 
no answer 18 37% 
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Do you feel satisfied with the amount of input sought from you and/or 
your representative(s) during the design process of the Red Snapper 
IFQ? 
Yes. 8 16% 
No. 39 80% 
no answer 2 4% 
   Do you feel that all stakeholders have been represented equally in the 
final product? 
Yes. 2 4% 
No. 44 90% 
Not sure at this time. 2 4% 
no answer 1 2% 
   When it comes to limiting access to the fishery, the Red Snapper IFQ goes 
Not far enough. 4 8% 
Too far. 31 63% 
Just far enough. 10 20% 
no answer 4 8% 
   Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the small owner-
operated fishing interests in the fishery? 
Yes. 4 8% 
No. 43 88% 
I'm not sure at this time. 2 4% 
no answer 0 0% 
   Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the interests of the 
local fishing-dependent communities in the fishery? 
Yes. 4 8% 
No. 40 82% 
I'm not sure at this time. 5 10% 
no answer 0 0% 
   Did your fishing habits/routine/schedule change due to the Red Snapper 
IFQ? 
Yes. 42 86% 
No. 6 12% 
Not yet, but they will soon. 1 2% 
no answer 0 0% 
   Has the intensity level in your fishing process (i.e. days spent at sea, time 
actually fishing, etc.) increased/decreased since inception of the IFQ? 
No change. 13 27% 
Yes, increased. 12 24% 
Yes, decreased. 20 41% 
Both increased and decreased, in different ways. 4 8% 
no answer 0 0% 
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Did the IFQ help or hurt with any financial costs of fishing (e.g. costs of 
fuel)? 
It helped. 2 4% 
It hurt. 35 71% 
No effect. 10 20% 
no answer 2 4% 
   Do you feel your personal income has been affected by the Red Snapper 
IFQ? 
No, and I don't foresee that it will be. 3 6% 
Yes, it has improved. 2 4% 
Yes, it has decreased. 37 76% 
Not yet, but it will improve my income in the future. 2 4% 
Not yet, but it will decrease my income in the future. 3 6% 
no answer 2 4% 
   Do you feel the analysis and final numbers posted by the National Marine 
Fishery Service in its annual Red Snapper IFQ Program reports are an 
accurate representation of the IFQ’s effects? (e.g. enforcement activities, 
bycatch data, price per pound) 
Somewhat accurate. 5 10% 
Very Accurate. 2 4% 
Somewhat inaccurate. 7 14% 
Very inaccurate. 20 41% 
I have not read the reports. 12 24% 
no answer 3 6% 
   Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about the 
design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? 
Very positive. 3 6% 
Somewhat positive. 5 10% 
No Feeling. 0 0% 
Somewhat negative. 11 22% 
Very negative. 29 59% 
no answer 1 2% 
   Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about how the 
Red Snapper IFQ has actually been implemented? 
Very positive. 3 6% 
Somewhat positive. 6 12% 
No feeling. 2 4% 
Somewhat negative. 9 18% 
Very negative. 28 57% 
no answer 1 2% 
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PHONE SURVEY 
How much previous exposure to IFQs did you have before implementation of 
the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ? 
No exposure at all. 27 55% 
No actual participation but knew of them. 17 35% 
No actual participation but studied the concept intently. 5 10% 
Participated in one before. 0 0% 
no answer 0 0% 
   From where was your previous knowledge of IFQ systems drawn? (check all 
that apply) 
Personal involvement in another IFQ system. 0 0% 
Experience of someone I know in another IFQ system. 8 16% 
Information from trade publications and/or websites. 10 20% 
Information from governmental publications and/or websites. 7 14% 
Information from published studies. 2 4% 
No previous knowledge. 28 57% 
other: 3 6% 
   What was your opinion of IFQ systems prior to this experience? 
 Strongly opposed. 16 33% 
Mildly opposed. 4 8% 
Strongly in favor. 10 20% 
Mildly in favor. 7 14% 
I had no opinion. 12 24% 
no answer 0 0% 
   Has your opinion of IFQ systems changed since implementation of the Red 
Snapper IFQ? 
Yes 18 37% 
No 29 59% 
no answer 2 4% 
   If yes, in what way? 
  I've become strongly in favor of them. 7 14% 
I've become less opposed but not totally in favor of them. 1 2% 
I am now reserving any opinion until I have more experience with this IFQ. 0 0% 
I've become less in favor but not totally opposed to them. 5 10% 
I've become totally opposed to them. 9 18% 
no answer 27 55% 
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Do you feel satisfied with the amount of input sought from you and/or your 
representative(s) during the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? 
Yes. 11 22% 
No. 35 71% 
no answer 3 6% 
   Do you feel that all stakeholders have been represented equally in the final 
product? 
Yes. 9 18% 
No. 36 73% 
Not sure at this time. 2 4% 
no answer 2 4% 
   When it comes to limiting access to the fishery, the Red Snapper IFQ goes 
Not far enough. 0 0% 
Too far. 27 55% 
Just far enough. 16 33% 
no answer 6 12% 
   Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the small owner-operated 
fishing interests in the fishery? 
Yes. 11 22% 
No. 35 71% 
I'm not sure at this time. 3 6% 
no answer 0 0% 
   Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the interests of the local 
fishing-dependent communities in the fishery? 
Yes. 11 22% 
No. 30 61% 
I'm not sure at this time. 7 14% 
no answer 1 2% 
   Did your fishing habits/routine/schedule change due to the Red Snapper IFQ? 
Yes. 29 59% 
No. 16 33% 
Not yet, but they will soon. 0 0% 
no answer 4 8% 
   Has the intensity level in your fishing process (i.e. days spent at sea, time 
actually fishing, etc.) increased/decreased since inception of the IFQ? 
No change. 20 41% 
Yes, increased. 3 6% 
Yes, decreased. 15 31% 
Both increased and decreased, in different ways. 1 2% 
no answer 10 20% 
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Did the IFQ help or hurt with any financial costs of fishing (e.g. costs of fuel)? 
It helped. 9 18% 
It hurt. 14 29% 
No effect. 21 43% 
no answer 5 10% 
   Do you feel your personal income has been affected by the Red Snapper IFQ? 
No, and I don't foresee that it will be. 8 16% 
Yes, it has improved. 7 14% 
Yes, it has decreased. 28 57% 
Not yet, but it will improve my income in the future. 3 6% 
Not yet, but it will decrease my income in the future. 1 2% 
no answer 2 4% 
   Do you feel the analysis and final numbers posted by the National Marine 
Fishery Service in its annual Red Snapper IFQ Program reports are an 
accurate representation of the IFQ’s effects? (e.g. enforcement activities, 
bycatch data, price per pound) 
Somewhat accurate. 5 10% 
Very Accurate. 7 14% 
Somewhat inaccurate. 8 16% 
Very inaccurate. 16 33% 
I have not read the reports. 13 27% 
no answer 0 0% 
   Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about the design 
process of the Red Snapper IFQ? 
Very positive. 4 8% 
Somewhat positive. 10 20% 
No Feeling. 4 8% 
Somewhat negative. 10 20% 
Very negative. 21 43% 
no answer 0 0% 
   Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about how the Red 
Snapper IFQ has actually been implemented? 
Very positive. 6 12% 
Somewhat positive. 17 35% 
No feeling. 7 14% 
Somewhat negative. 4 8% 
Very negative. 13 27% 
no answer 2 4% 
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In 2008, how much quota percentage were you allotted and what did you do with it? 
Table B1: Quota Amounts of Survey Participants in Eastern Gulf/Peninsula  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community Quota (pounds) 
Disposition of 
quota 
KEY WEST 100 did nothing 
SAFETY HARBOR 113 fished it 
YANKEETOWN 100 sold some of it 
PARRISH 30 no answer 
FT MYERS BCH 80 fished it 
REDINGTON SHORES 100 fished it 
TAMPA 500 nothing 
PALM HARBOR 7 nothing 
MORRISTON 34 nothing 
HUDSON 7 nothing 
HERNANDO BCH 37 nothing 
SARASOTA 50 nothing 
ST. PETERSBURG 138 sold it 
SEMINOLE 7 fished it 
SEMINOLE 167 sold it 
NAPLES 1 nothing 
HUDSON 200 fished it 
PALMETTO BAY 200 sold it 
INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 67 fished it 
BRADENTON 2000 fished it 
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Table B2: Quota Amounts of Survey Participants in Northern Gulf/Panhandle 
 
Community Quota (pounds) Disposition of quota 
PENSACOLA 13,000 fished it 
STEINHATCHEE 2,800 fished it 
STEINHATCHEE 125 did nothing  
PANAMA CITY 0.07% fished it 
STEINHATCHEE 37 did nothing 
FT.WALTON BEACH 200 sold it 
DESTIN 24000 fished it 
PANAMA CITY 3 did nothing 
PANAMA CITY 92 did nothing 
PENSACOLA 1400 fished it 
PANAMA CITY 1000 fished it 
DESTIN >5% both fished and sold it 
CARRABELLE  200 sold it 
TALLAHASSEE 52 did nothing 
PANAMA CITY No answer fished it 
CARRABELLE 165 sold it 
PANAMA CITY FL 473 fished it 
PANAMA CITY 300 fished it 
PANAMA CITY 240 fished it 
MARY ESTHER 50,000 fished it 
DESTIN 7980 fished it 
GRAND RIDGE 2000 fished it 
LYNN HAVEN 30,000 leased most 
LYNN HAVEN 35,000 leased most 
STEINHATCHEE 200 fished it 
CRAWFORDVILLE 400 sold it 
PANAMA CITY BEACH 260 fished it 
CANTONMENT 200 No answer 
PANACEA 600 fished it 
 
 
 
 
